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A Human Right to Self-Government over First Nations Child and 
Family Services and Beyond: Implications of the Caring Society 
Case 
 
NAIOMI WALQWAN METALLIC 
 
Le 26 janvier 2016, le Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne a rendu une décision 
qui marque un tournant dans la cause de la Société de soutien à l’enfance et à la famille 
des Premières Nations du Canada et al. c. Procureur général du Canada (pour le 
ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien). Le tribunal a conclu que la 
conception, la gestion et le contrôle des services d’aide à l’enfance dans les réserves et 
de leurs modes de financement par le ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord 
Canada (AINC) causent de nombreux préjudices aux enfants et aux familles des 
Premières Nations, allant jusqu’à de la discrimination. Un tableau complet des rouages et 
des préjudices du Programme des services à l’enfance et à la famille des Premières 
Nations (le Programme des SEFPN) d’AINC, jumelé aux deux principaux arguments de 
la décision du tribunal prouvent solidement l’argument que les Premières Nations ont un 
droit fondamental à l’autonomie gouvernementale à l’égard des services d’aide à 
l’enfance et à la famille. Ces deux arguments consistent à ce qu’en vertu des droits de la 
personne : 1) les Premières Nations ont droit à des services d’aide à l’enfance et à la 
famille adaptés à leur situation et leurs besoins culturels, historiques et géographiques et 
2) ces services ne peuvent pas être conçu pour les assimiler ou avoir l’effet de les 
assimiler. De plus, comme les principaux éléments structuraux et préjudices du 
Programme des SEFPN se retrouvent dans pratiquement tous les autres programmes de 
services essentiels dans les réserves, l’insinuation finale de la cause de la Société de 
soutien est qu’un droit fondamental à l’autonomie gouvernementale s’applique 
vraisemblablement à tous les services essentiels des Premières Nations. 
  
On 26 January 2016, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal released a watershed decision 
in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General 
(Caring Society), finding that the Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs’ 
(INAC) design, management, and control of child welfare services on reserve, along 
with its funding formulas, cause a number of harms to First Nations children and 
families that amount to discrimination. A full appreciation of the workings and harms of 
INAC’s First Nations Child and Family Services Program (the FNCFS Program), paired 
with the two key propositions from the tribunal’s decision—that, as a matter of human 
rights: (1) First Nations are entitled to child and family services that meet their cultural, 
historical, and geographical needs and circumstances, and (2) such services cannot be 
assimilative in design or effect—firmly ground an argument that First Nations have a 
human right to self-government over child and family services. Moreover, because the 
main structural features and harms of the FNCFS Program are common to virtually all 
other essential service programs on reserve, the final implication of the Caring Society 
                                                          
 Naiomi Walqwan Metallic, a Mìgmaq woman from the Listuguj First Nation, is an Assistant Professor and 
Chancellor’s Chair in Aboriginal Law and Policy at the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, and 
counsel with Burchells LLP in Halifax, NS. 
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case is that a human right to self-government likely extends to all First Nations essential 
services.  
 
ON 26 JANUARY 2016, THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL (the “Tribunal”) 
released a watershed decision in a complaint spearheaded by the First Nations Child and Family 
Caring Society of Canada (the “Caring Society”), headed by Dr. Cindy Blackstock and the 
Assembly of First Nations (the “Caring Society” decision).1 The complaint alleged that Canada, 
through its Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (INAC or the “Department”),2 
discriminates against First Nations children and families in the provision of child welfare 
services on reserve. In its decision, the Tribunal found that INAC’s design, management, and 
control of child welfare services on reserve, along with its funding formulas, cause a number of 
harms to First Nations children and families that amount to discrimination. Canada did not 
appeal the decision.3  
Public discourse following the case emphasized that INAC can no longer underfund First 
Nations child welfare services as compared to the provinces’/territories’ funding of similar 
services to other residents of Canada.4 However, the case goes much further than setting out this 
                                                          
1 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society]. 
2 In August 2017, the Prime Minister announced that the Department would be split into two new departments: A 
Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs (CIRNA), and a Department of Indigenous 
Services (DISC). See Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, Press Release, “New Ministers to Support the 
Renewed Relationship with Indigenous Peoples,” (28 August 2017). CIRNA’s mandate is to promote nation-to-
nation, Inuit-Crown, and government-to-government relationships to accelerate self-government and self-
determination agreements based on new policies, laws, and operational practices. DISC’s mandate is to continue the 
important work of improving the quality of services delivered to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people. First Nations 
child welfare services now fall under the mandate of DISC. However, for reasons of ease and historical continuity, I 
will refer to DISC using its previous acronym, INAC, in this article. 
3 See e.g. CBC News, “Federal Government Won’t Appeal Ruling That Found It Discriminated Against Children on 
Reserves”, CBC News (22 February 2016), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-government-not-appeal-children-
reserves-1.3458969> [perma.cc/RNH2-DCW9]. The Tribunal ordered Canada to cease its discriminatory practices 
and reform the FNCFS Program. There remained a number of remedial issues to be addressed, however, and the 
Tribunal has retained jurisdiction until any and all orders are fully implemented. Over the past two years, there have 
been ongoing implementation and non-compliance issues and the Tribunal has issued further rulings. See: 2016 
CHRT 10; 2016 CHRT 11; 2016 CHRT 16; 2017 CHRT 14; and 2018 CHRT 4. In the latest ruling, the Tribunal 
emphasized that its January 2016 decision “was not a recommendation; it is legally binding” (para 41) and suggested 
that Canada had been more focused on financial considerations than the best interests of First Nations or in 
addressing its liability since the decision (para 132). Following this last ruling, Canada announced a plan to address 
First Nations child welfare. See John Paul Tasker, “Jane Philpott Unveils 6-Point Plan to Improve 'Perverse' First 
Nations Child Welfare System”, CBC News (25 January 2018), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/jane-philpott-six-
point-plan-first-nations-child-welfare-1.4503264> [perma.cc/7BGN-6US8]. 
4 This focus may relate to the Tribunal’s endorsement and expansive interpretation of “Jordan’s Principle” (see 
Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 362–93, 481). This principle holds that where a government service is available 
to all other children and a jurisdictional dispute arises between Canada and a province/territory, or between 
departments in the same government, the government department of first contact pays for the service and can seek 
reimbursement from the other government/department after the child has received the service. Jordan’s Principle 
suggests, at the very least, that First Nations children are entitled to treatment equal to other children in Canada. It was an 
important principle for the Tribunal to endorse given that such disputes are commonplace in the First Nations context. 
My argument here, however, is that the decision goes even further than this. Consequently, this article will not be 
focusing on Jordan’s Principle. For an argument that Jordan’s Principle has broader equality and self-government 
implications, see Colleen Sheppard, “Jordan’s Principle: Reconciliation and the First Nations Child” (2018) 26:4 
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 3. 
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minimum standard of formal equality. In determining what the non-discriminatory treatment of 
First Nations children and families entails, the Tribunal held that the standard of substantive 
equality requires that First Nations people receive child and family services that meet “their 
cultural, historical and geographical needs and circumstances.”5 The Tribunal did not qualify that 
this requirement relates only to the funding; indeed it suggested that First Nations child and 
family services as a whole, inclusive of funding, must meet this standard.6  
Despite the fact that the word “self-government” is never used in the decision, taken to its 
logical conclusion, the case implies that First Nations have such a right in regards to children and 
family services. While there are varying definitions and models of First Nations self-government, 
its core feature is real decision-making power resting in the hands of Indigenous peoples over 
matters affecting their day-to-day lives. The Caring Society decision, while not using the 
language of “self-government” or prescribing the particular form it should take, signifies that 
First Nations must exercise meaningful control over the content and delivery of child welfare 
services in their communities as a matter of human rights law. This is because, in order for child 
welfare services to meet their cultural, historical, and geographical needs and circumstances as 
required by the decision, First Nations people must necessarily be the ones to design and control 
such services. The idea was expressed most succinctly by a member of the Carrier-Sekani Tribal 
Council, quoted in a 1983 report of a special House of Commons Committee charged with 
studying Indian Self-Government: “The principle is simple. Only Indian people can design 
systems for Indians. Anything other than that is assimilation.”7 
This conclusion builds on the Tribunal’s findings about how the design and delivery of 
INAC’s First Nations Child and Family Services Program (the FNCFS Program) harms First 
Nations children and their families. Ultimately, the Tribunal concludes that the FNCFS Program 
replicates many of the assimilative aims and effects of the Indian Residential School system. 
                                                          
5 Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 465. “Formal equality” as a concept tends to emphasize identical treatment 
between individuals (“treating likes alike”) as the high-water mark of equality. One problem with this approach is 
that it tends to privilege one set of norms (usually those of the majority) to the exclusion of other groups, and 
thereby can result in seemingly “neutral” laws or policies having a disproportionate effect on other groups going 
unchallenged. Formal equality has been discarded by the Supreme Court of Canada as a standard of equality in 
favour of substantive equality (see: Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 166; R v 
Beaulac, [1999] 1 SCR 768 at paras 22–24; Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 
SCR 203; R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at paras 15–16; Withler v Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 SCR 396) 
[Withler]; Quebec (Attorney General) v A, [2013] 1 SCR 61). According to the Court, substantive equality 
recognizes and celebrates difference, recognizing that all human beings are equally deserving of concern, respect, 
and consideration. This approach is mindful that laws and policies should not have disproportionate impacts on 
some individuals or groups more than others on account of protected group characteristics like race, ethnicity, 
gender, disability, et cetera. 
6 Given the Caring Society case was about First Nations and First Nations Child and Family Services Program on 
reserve, my arguments will similarly focus on First Nations living on reserve. By “First Nations” I am referring to 
those people who are registered under the Indian Act, i.e., “Status Indians.” (“First Nations” is now the more 
commonly used term to refer to “Indians,” but discussions in the context of the Indian Act or older documents or 
quotes may necessitate use of the word “Indian.”) Discussion of the implications of Caring Society for other 
Indigenous groups, including First Nations living off-reserve, Métis, and Inuit peoples, are beyond the scope of this 
article. However, the ruling in Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12, that 
Canada’s section 91(24) constitutional jurisdiction over “Indians” includes non-status Indians and Métis, coupled 
with the finding in Caring Society that Canada is primarily responsible for child welfare services pursuant to section 
91(24), suggests that Canada ought to play a greater role in child welfare services for Métis and those off-reserve 
than it has in the past. 
7 House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Indian Self-Government in Canada (12–20 
October 1983) at 29 (Chair: Keith Penner) [Penner Report]. 
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This is clear recognition that government programs that attempt to assimilate First Nations 
people violate Canadian human rights norms. One of the aims of this article is to detail the 
history of the FNCFS Program and catalogue its problems and the various harms it causes to 
First Nations people so that the reader has a full appreciation of the extent to which the FNCFS is 
assimilative and discriminatory. 
A full appreciation of the workings and harms of the FNCFS Program, paired with the 
two key propositions from Caring Society—that, as a matter of human rights: (1) First Nations 
are entitled to child and family services that meet their cultural, historical, and geographical 
needs and circumstances; and (2) such services cannot be assimilative in design or effect—firmly 
ground the argument that First Nations have a human right to self-government over child and 
family services. Furthermore, because the main structural features and harms of the FNCFS are 
common to virtually all other essential service programs on reserve, the final implication of the 
Caring Society case is that a human right to self-government likely extends to all First Nations 
essential services.8 
This article is in three parts. Part I gives an overview of how the FNCFS Program came 
to be and how it operates. Part II describes the various problems and harms arising from the 
FNCFS Program. Finally, Part III considers key findings of the Caring Society decision, how 
they relate to those harms, and the implications of the Tribunal’s findings. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF FIRST NATIONS CHILD WELFARE 
SYSTEM9 
 
Although informal systems to provide assistance and protection to orphaned and abandoned 
children sprung up in Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, child welfare as 
a formal system involving state-sanctioned intervention into the private lives of families to 
protect abused or neglected children, only took shape following the Second World War.10 WWII 
had a tremendous impact on the social and economic policies of countries throughout the world, 
including Canada. Revulsion to the treatment of Jewish people and other groups persecuted by 
the Nazis spurred increased concern for equality and human rights in Canada and beyond. 
Following the war came the rise of the welfare state in Canada and, with this, a great expansion 
                                                          
8 This includes First Nations’ social assistance, elderly/disability care, housing, health, education, water, policing, 
and emergency services. These services have long suffered from all the same problems plaguing First Nations child 
and family services. Indeed, many of these services are currently the subject of ongoing human rights complaints 
similar to Caring Society. See Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Submission to the Committee on The 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the Occasion of its Consideration of Canada’s 21st–23rd Periodic Reports” 
(July 2017) at 10: “Although the child and family services case was the first of its kind to be adjudicated on its 
merits, similar complaints have also been filed with respect to other services that the Government of Canada funds 
and provides to First Nations peoples on reserve. For example, there are currently complaints before the CHRT with 
respect to such matters as special education, health services, assisted living and income assistance benefits, and 
policing” [emphasis added]. 
9 In the remainder of the article, a reference to provinces is also intended to include a reference to the territories. 
10 Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto: Canadian Council on Social 
Development in association with James Lorimer & Company, 1983) at 2. This is not to suggest that the Canadian 
state was not involved in taking children from First Nations families prior to WWII. Quite the opposite, child 
welfare matters were intertwined with the matter of education in the residential school policy. Prior to the 1960s, if a 
First Nations family was deemed by the Indian Agent to have some problem, children were often removed to 
residential schools. Sometimes, First Nations in need of alternative care would be taken in and looked after by 
members of their extended families, which included aunts, uncles and grandparents. 
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of laws dealing with essential services enacted by both provincial governments and Canada, 
including laws regarding the welfare of children.11 
Below I describe the origin of the child welfare system that applies to First Nations living 
on reserve in Canada, organizing this story to highlight the three key structural features that 
characterize this system: (A.) jurisdictional neglect; (B.) provincial comparability; and (C.) 
program devolution. 
 
A. JURISDICTIONAL NEGLECT 
 
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal government legislative 
jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” This power enables the federal 
government to pass laws that would otherwise fall under provincial jurisdiction if they were to 
apply to non-Indigenous persons.12 On the other hand, under the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
provinces have jurisdiction over property and civil rights in the province and over all matters of a 
local or private nature pursuant to sections 92(13) and (16), respectively. These powers are 
generally regarded as assigning jurisdiction over social services to the provinces.13 These 
competing constitutional provisions form the backdrop of one of the leading features of the First 
Nations child welfare system—indeed of all essential services in First Nations communities—a 
long-standing jurisdictional dispute between the federal government and provinces. Unlike most 
jurisdictional disputes, however, it is not a situation of both levels of government claiming power 
over the other, but rather neither wanting to assume primary jurisdiction and each claiming the 
other is responsible. The result of this has been “jurisdictional neglect”—that is, both the federal 
and provincial governments play a role in this system, but neither accepts accountability for 
ensuring First Nations are receiving adequate services, resulting in a diluted responsibility on the 
part of both governments. 
Space does not permit a lengthy review of the over three hundred years of history leading 
up to the post WWII period, but it bears emphasizing that there have been different phases in the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and Canada,14 and the period from Confederation to the 
mid-twentieth century represented the darkest one. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) called it the era of “Domination and Assimilation,” when the new nation of 
Canada saw the Indigenous peoples on these lands as uncivilized and inferior peoples.15 Through 
a variety of coercive measures, First Nations peoples were displaced from their territories and 
placed on reserves, where it was hoped that they might eventually become extinct from disease 
and starvation or become assimilated into mainstream culture.16 On reserves, First Nations were 
barred from exercising their traditional subsistence livelihoods, and federal rations to alleviate 
                                                          
11 See Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman & David Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 6th ed 
(Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications, 2010) at 3–4, 8. 
12 See Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (loose-leaf) (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), ch 28 at 5; 
Sébastien Grammond, “Federal Legislation on Indigenous Child Welfare in Canada,” (2018) 28 JL & Soc Pol’y 132 
at 137–38. See also AG Canada v Canada, [1976] 1 SCR 170 at 191 (per Ritchie J). 
13 See Hogg, supra note 12, ch 33 at 5. 
14 There are: (1) Separate Worlds (pre-contact to 1600); (2) Nation-to-Nation relations (from 1600 to mid-1800s); 
(3) Domination and Assimilation (mid-1800s to mid-twentieth century); and (4) Renewal and Renegotiation (mid-
twentieth century to the present). See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), ch 4–7. 
15 Ibid, ch 6. 
16 Ibid at 132–38. 
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starvation were provided sparingly.17 Further, the federal government pursued a policy of 
cultural genocide through sending thousands of Indigenous children to residential schools.18 In 
addition, the federal Indian Act and policies of the government of Canada sought to ban First 
Nations’ spiritual and governance practices, as well as erode First Nations’ cultural, political, and 
collective identities.19 A point to underscore here is that until the end of WWII, the federal 
government fully accepted control over social policy and the welfare of First Nations pursuant to 
section 91(24) (albeit in a highly problematic and harmful way).20 As will be seen, Canada 
would disclaim such jurisdiction in the post WWII era. 
In addition to the rise of the welfare state, the period following WWII was also when 
Canadians became more aware and concerned about the impoverished living conditions of First 
Nations on reserve.21 The Canadian government first appointed a “Joint House of Commons and 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs” in 1944 to inquire into the general conditions of Indians 
living on reserves, followed by a Special Joint Parliamentary Committee in 1946.22 The reports 
and recommendations of these committees consistently focused on the need to advance Indians 
to full citizenship and equality. The objective was still assimilation, but, as observed by Shewell 
and Spagnut: “It was no longer a question of subjugating Indians and of degrading their cultures, 
but of extending to them their rightful opportunities to be full and equal citizens of Canada.”23 
The ethos of this period embraced formal equality. Pursuant to this, First Nations ought to be 
treated like all other citizens, and their legal status as “Indians” and different legal entitlements 
arising therefrom (treaties, reserves, the Indian Act, et cetera) were perceived as holding First 
Nations back from becoming full citizens. 
In 1950, the Joint Committee reported that First Nations on reserves were excluded from 
many federal social programs and most provincial services that were now provided to Canadian 
citizens. In response, the Committee recommended that the provinces be more involved in 
delivering and funding social services to First Nations.24 In response to this, at the time of 
making several amendments to the Indian Act in 1951, Canada inserted section 87 (now section 
88) into the Act.25 Section 88 provides that “all laws of general application from time to time in 
force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province”26 except to the 
extent such laws were inconsistent with the Indian Act, regulations, or by-laws made thereunder 
and subject also to the terms of any treaty or other federal law. 27 On its face, section 88 appears 
                                                          
17 Hugh Shewell, “Enough to Keep Them Alive”: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873–1965 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004) at 327–29. 
18 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of 
the Final Report of Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, 2015) at 37ff [TRC]. 
19 Ibid at 1–21. 
20 Hugh Shewell, “Why Jurisdiction Matters: Social Policy, Social Services and First Nations” (2016) 36 Canadian 
Journal of Native Studies 179 at 193 [Shewell, “Jurisdiction Matters”]. 
21 Hugh Shewell & Annabel Spagnut, “The First Nations of Canada: Social Welfare and the Quest for Self-
Government” in John Dixon & Robert P Scheurell, eds, Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples (London: 
Routledge, 1995) 1 at 2. 
22 Ibid at 3; Shewell, “Jurisdiction Matters,” supra note 20 at 182. 
23 Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 3. 
24 See Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Income Assistance Program – National Manual (Ottawa: 
INAC, 2005) at 13 [INAC, “Income Assistance”]. 
25 Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29, s 87. The current legislation is the Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, s 88. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Section 88 was initially regarded as the basis for the application of provincial laws to Indians. However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada altered this narrative in Dick v La Reine, [1985] 2 SCR 309 [Dick]. (Earlier the Court had 
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to delegate any matters not covered by the Indian Act or its regulations to provincial 
jurisdiction.28 
If section 88 was intended to be a delegation to the provinces in the area of social 
services over Indians, it was ineffective because it was done unilaterally. Parliament could not 
force the provinces to extend services to Indians—and spend provincial revenues on them—if 
the provinces were unwilling. Consequently, most provinces did not automatically assume 
legislative and fiscal jurisdiction over Indians with the passing of section 88. Most provinces 
took the position that the federal government had full responsibility to deliver services to First 
Nations on reserve and were reluctant to extend their child welfare services for that reason.29 
Their position was reinforced by First Nations organizations making similar arguments.30 
With section 88 being largely ineffective as a means of delegating responsibility over 
Indians to the provinces and territories, the federal government then sought to negotiate with the 
provinces for their assumption of jurisdiction over essential services to First Nations.31 Over the 
next fifteen-year period, the federal government would strike further Parliamentary 
Committees,32 undertake a national study of Indian Affairs,33 hold Federal-Provincial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
been split on this question in Natural Parents v Superintendent of Child Welfare et al, [1976] 2 SCR 751.) In Dick, a 
unanimous panel made up of five members of the Court stated that provincial laws that do not touch on the core of 
“Indianness” apply to Indians ex proprio vigore (of their own force) and section 88 only related to general provincial 
laws that affect Indianness. The ruling sits uncomfortably with the particular history of interactions between 
provincial and federal governments over First Nations issues, as well as Indigenous perspectives on the nature of 
their relationship with the federal government as treaty partners (see infra note 30). In the area of reconciliation, the 
Court may be called upon to reconsider Dick and find it outdated. 
28 There is little on the public record providing a clear explanation of the government’s rationale for it. See Kerry 
Wilkins, “Still Crazy After All These Years: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38:2 Alta L Rev 458 at 
460–64. 
29 Johnston, supra note 10 at 5. Thus, initially, only some provincial child welfare programs were extended to 
residents of some reserves in some provinces (at 3). 
30 Ibid at 5. Writing in 1983, Johnston spoke of First Nations’ distrust of the provinces at the time: “The issue of 
jurisdiction is not simply a dispute between the province and provincial governments, however. The people most 
concerned, status Indians, have consistently taken the position that the federal government alone has authority and 
responsibility for all services provided to Indian people. The position of status Indians is also manifest in their deep 
mistrust of provincial government involvement in any issue that affects them” (at 6). For certain the picture has 
become more nuanced in recent years, as we have seen increased efforts at provincial and First Nations 
collaboration over policy and legislative changes to better accommodate First Nations’ needs in some jurisdictions, 
including in the area of child welfare (see Appendix C for a summary of legislative changes). Nonetheless, there 
continues to be scholarship critical of court decisions permitting extensive provincial jurisdiction over Indigenous 
affairs concurrent with the federal section 91(24) power. Such scholarship argues that the exclusive jurisdiction over 
“Indians and lands reserved for Indians” in section 91(24) stems from promises set out in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 and treaties whereby the Crown, succeeded by the federal government post-Confederation, would protect 
Indigenous lands, rights, and sovereignty from encroachment from local interests represented by the provinces. See 
e.g. John Borrows, “Canada’s Colonial Constitution” in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right 
Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historic Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 
17–38; Bruce McIvor & Kate Gunn, “Stepping into Canada’s Shores: Tsilqot’in, Grassy Narrows and the Division 
of Powers,” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 146. 
31 See INAC, “Income Assistance,” supra note 24 at 13. 
32 Canada struck a Joint Parliamentary Committee review of Indian Affairs’ policies and progress beginning in 1959. 
See Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 4. 
33 See Canada, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, “A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A 
Report on Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies in Two Volumes,” HB Hawthorne (ed) (Ottawa: 
IAND, October 1966). 
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Conferences on Indian Affairs,34 and legislate a mechanism to enable Canada and individual 
provinces to enter cost-sharing agreements over the delivery of provincial social programs on 
reserve35—all with a goal of persuading the provinces to extend their essential services to First 
Nations on reserve. 
These efforts largely failed. Canada was only successful in persuading one province, 
Ontario, to extend its general social programs to First Nations.36 Beyond this, there was no 
similar uptake from other provinces, or generally to other areas such as health, education, water, 
and infrastructure. It was only in the area of child welfare (and much later in the 1990s with 
regard to policing)37 that provinces were receptive to extending their legislation and child 
welfare services to First Nations on reserve. Here, too, the results were mixed, as can be seen 
from the chart at Appendix A summarizing the arrangements for provincial welfare services on 
reserve by jurisdiction from 1960–1980 as set out in Patrick Johnston’s text, Native Children and 
the Child Welfare System.38 Only five jurisdictions (British Columbia (BC), Ontario (ON), Nova 
Scotia (NS), Newfoundland (NFLD), and Yukon (YK)) signed general bilateral agreements with 
the federal government to extend some or all of provincial child welfare services to reserves.39 
The remaining jurisdictions did not sign agreements with the federal government; however, they 
nevertheless extended child welfare services, though the extent to which they did varied widely. 
Many of these jurisdictions only extended apprehension services in the most extreme cases of 
neglect or upon request (Saskatchewan (SK), Manitoba (MB), New Brunswick (NB), and Prince 
Edward Island (PEI)) while a couple (Alberta (AB) and Northwest Territories (NT)) extended a 
broader range of services. Consequently, the picture of child welfare services on reserve in this 
period was scattershot. In the words of Johnston: “The end result is an incredible disparity in the 
quantity and quality of child welfare programs available to status Indians from one province to 
another. In some instances, there is disparity within a single province.”40 This picture would 
change dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, with First Nations taking over the delivery of child 
welfare from the provinces with the rise of program devolution, discussed further below. 
 
B. Provincial Comparability 
 
While Canada was attempting to persuade the provinces to assume jurisdiction over social 
programs on reserve, most First Nations went without such basic services in their communities. 
Amidst mounting pressure to address this problem, Canada finally responded in 1964.41 Treasury 
Board approval in June 1964 to “adopt provincial or local municipal standards and procedures 
                                                          
34 See Canada, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship & Immigration, Federal-Provincial Conference on 
Indian Affairs: Report of Proceedings (Ottawa: October 1964) [Federal-Provincial Conference]. 
35 In 1966, Canada enacted Canada Assistance Plan, 1966 SC c 45 [repealed SC 1995, c 17, ss 31–32], Part II, 
“Indian Welfare” [Canada Assistance Plan]. 
36 The 1965 Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Welfare Programs for Indians between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of Ontario instituted a cost-sharing arrangement respecting the application of provincial 
welfare laws to Indian reserves in the province. See Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 16. 
37 This occurred pursuant to First Nations Policing Program. For more information see Expert Panel on Indigenous 
Communities, Toward Peace, Harmony, and Well-Being: Policing in Indigenous Communities (Ottawa, Ontario: 
Canadian Council of Academies, forthcoming 2019) ch 4. 
38 Johnston, supra note 10. 
39 MB and QC had smaller agreements for specific communities within their jurisdiction. 
40 Johnston, supra note 10 at 20. 
41 Shewell, “Jurisdiction Matters,” supra note 20 at 184. 
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for the administration of relief assistance for Indians,”42 had the effect of authorizing the 
Department to pay for welfare relief (e.g., social assistance) for First Nations in accordance with 
provincial standards and rates. Shortly after this, the regional offices of INAC instructed staff to 
develop their own social assistance policies modelled on provincial legislation.43 Over time, the 
1964 Treasury Board authority was replaced with similar authorities with expanded reach to all 
other essential service areas—always with the requirement that the services provided be similar 
to those provided by the provinces.44 This requirement has come to be referred to as the 
“comparability” or “reasonable comparability” standard.45 It has two general implications. First, 
it means that funding for services on reserve should reflect what the provinces fund for similar 
services. In providing this funding, Canada has consistently maintained it has no constitutional 
obligation to legislate or provide essential services to First Nations, and its involvement in this 
area is strictly as a matter of the federal spending power as a matter of good public policy.46 
Second, it means that the substantive standards of service on reserve must reflect those 
set out in provincial legislation and policy. In the case of essential services like child welfare and 
policing, where the provinces have accepted some involvement, provincial legislation applies on 
reserve directly. However, in the case of services where provinces have refused involvement, 
such as in social assistance and education, Canada applies provincial legislation indirectly 
through incorporation of provincial standards into its policies. In both cases, provincial standards 
have been imposed on First Nations without their consent even though, by the early 1960s, the 
government acknowledged that First Nations’ consent should be obtained.47  
Today, provincial comparability operates in tandem with program devolution. 
 
C. Program Devolution 
 
                                                          
42 Canada, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship & Immigration, “Authority to Introduce Increased 
Rates of Assistance to Indians: Details of Request to the Honourable The Treasury Board” (Ottawa: 16 June 1964). 
43 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Circular 107: Application of Provincial General Welfare 
Assistance Programs (Ottawa: 20 July 1964). 
44 Shewell, “Jurisdiction Matters,” supra note 20 at 184. 
45 See Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 342; Simon v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2013 FC 1117, rev’d 2015 FCA 18. 
46 Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 15; INAC, “Income Assistance,” supra note 24 at 15; Culhane D Speck, 
“The Indian Health Transfer Policy: A Step in the Right Direction, or Revenge of the Hidden Agenda?” (1989) 5:1 
Native Studies Review 187; Constance MacIntosh, “Jurisdictional Roulette: Constitutional and Structural Barriers to 
Aboriginal Access to Health” in Frontiers of Fairness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 6–7. 
47 In the Federal-Provincial Conferences on Indians Affairs that occurred in 1963 and 1964, First Nations 
consultation and consent to the extension of provincial services to their communities was identified as a fundamental 
principle among the Minister (see Federal-Provincial Conference, supra note 34 at 16). This was also a requirement 
of the 1965 Canada-Ontario Agreement (see Brown v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 251 at para 21 
[Brown]), as well as a requirement of Canada Assistance Plan, supra note 35, s 11(2). Also, in a “circular” dated 9 
December 1964, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Indian Affairs Branch of the federal Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration advised his federal colleagues that he would view it as a “serious breach of faith with 
the Indian people if any provincial services were forced on a Band against its wishes” (see Brown at para 22). There 
is no evidence, however, that consultation or consent for the extension of provincial laws, including child welfare 
laws, ever occurred. This finding of fact regarding First Nations in Ontario was made in Brown at paras 34–36. This 
author is not aware of any evidence or argument that First Nations in other provinces were ever consulted or 
consented. 
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Program devolution is essentially a downloading process where a program’s operations are 
shifted to the local level, producing what Rae calls “self-administration or self-management.”48 
Through this, a First Nation government49 or another body authorized by it, gains the ability to 
deliver the program to the community, using First Nations staff or other employees of its 
choosing.50 This is effectuated through the use of funding agreements between Canada and First 
Nations. 
Program devolution has its origins in Canada’s attempts to back-peddle from negative 
First Nations reaction to the 1969 White Paper policy. The policy proposed to eliminate First 
Nations’ “special rights” under the Indian Act and treaties in the name of formal equality.51 First 
Nations reacted with fierce opposition, seeing this as the ultimate form of assimilation, and 
Canada was forced to withdraw the policy.52 Following this, INAC began to explore program 
delivery mechanisms that gave greater priority to Aboriginal concepts of community priorities 
starting in the 1970s and 80s. It was during this time that the Department started to experiment 
with program devolution.53 
Regarding the history of program devolution in relation to child welfare services on 
reserve, INAC began experimenting with some informal child welfare agreements with First 
Nations in the late 1960s,54 and a broader transfer of child welfare responsibilities to First 
Nations began in the 1980s.55 In 1991, INAC introduced a new national funding formula, 
Directive 20-1, which formalized the mechanisms for program devolution of child welfare 
services to First Nations child and family service agencies (FNCFS Agencies).56 FNCFS 
Agencies typically represent a collective of First Nations.57 For a FNCFS Agency to exercise 
powers, Directive 20-1 also requires a preliminary agreement be signed between the province 
and Agency wherein it is delegated the power to exercise authority under provincial child 
welfare legislation.58 While there are delegated FNCFS Agencies in Ontario, owing to the 1965 
Agreement between Canada and Ontario, INAC does not directly fund program devolution to 
First Nations Bands and Agencies in Ontario. Instead, these Agencies are funded by the 
province, which is in turn reimbursed by the federal government.59 There are also a handful of 
FNCFS Agencies that are not created by delegation under provincial statute, but pursuant to 
Indian Act by-laws and tripartite or self-government agreements.60 The Caring Society indicates 
                                                          
48 Judith Rae, “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or Quagmire for First Nations?” (2008-2009) 7 
Indigenous LJ 1 at 7. 
49 In particular, I am referring to a “Council of a Band,” the government of a Band, as recognized under section 2 of 
the Indian Act, supra note 25. 
50 Rae, supra note 48 at 7. 
51 Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 5. 
52 See Johnston, supra note 10 at 6–7. 
53 Shewell and Spagnut, supra note 21 at 17; INAC, “Income Assistance,” supra note 24; INAC, “Indian Band 
Government Legislation” (1982) (National Archives). 
54 Johnston, supra note 10, ch 6. 
55 Vandna Sinha et al, “Kiskisik Awasisak: Remember the Children. Understanding the Overrepresentation of First 
Nations Children in the Child Welfare System” (Ontario: Assembly of First Nations, 2011) at 7. 
56 See Marlyn Bennett, First Nations Fact Sheet: A General Profile on First Nations Child Welfare in Canada 
(Ottawa: First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, n.d.) at 3–4; Sinha et al, supra note 55 at 7. 
57 Some individual First Nations in New Brunswick had their own agencies: see New Brunswick Child & Youth 
Advocate, Hand-in-Hand: A Review of First Nations Child Welfare in New Brunswick (February 2010) at 18. 
58 Bennett, supra note 56 at 3–4. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at 4–5; Vandna Sinha & Anna Kozlowski, “The Structure of Aboriginal Child Welfare in Canada,” online: 
2013) 4:2 International Indigenous Policy Journal 2,  
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that there are currently seventy-six FNCFS/First Nations Agencies operating across Canada.61 
There are also some areas where provincial or territorial agencies continue to provide services to 
First Nations communities.62 A chart summarizing this current and varied picture of First Nations 
child welfare services across the country can be found at Appendix B. 
Canada uses a funding model known as “contribution agreements” to deliver funds to 
FNCFS Agencies receiving funding directly from INAC (i.e., all except those in Ontario). This is 
the least flexible funding model, as Canada dictates the terms and conditions and performance 
requirements to be met under these agreements.63 This is how the provincial comparability 
standards get incorporated into the agreements. Typically, a schedule in the agreement will set 
out program requirements to each devolved program that stipulate adherence to provincial 
standards, either directly in the case of child welfare, or indirectly through incorporation of 
provincial standards into INAC policies that must be followed. For the FNCFS Program, the 
schedule requires FNCFS Agencies to “administer the [FNCFS] Program in accordance with 
Provincial/Territorial legislation, as well as DIAND’s Social Programs-National Manual and 
any other current approved program documentation issued by DIAND as amended from time to 
time.”64 
Contribution agreements also require First Nations to submit numerous reports on 
spending for different programs. In addition to these reports, the agreements require First 
Nations to prepare annual consolidated financial statements and disclose these to community 
members upon request, in addition to the Band’s conflict of interest policy, annual report of 
activities, and fiscal plans.65 A delegation agreement with the provinces can also impose 
additional reporting and accountability requirements on a FNCFS Agency.66  
Canada could choose to use other, more flexible, funding models, such as grants67 or 
intergovernmental transfers,68 to transfer essential services funding to First Nations, but is 
resistant to doing so. Owing to criticism over the appropriateness of using contribution 
agreements in the First Nations context, over the years, successive governments have tweaked 
the model in an attempt to make it more flexible. This has included allowing some Bands to have 
longer-term agreements (typically two to five years) with slightly more flexibility in how Bands 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=iipj> [perma.cc/N2DC-9CDL]; National Collaborating 
Center for Aboriginal Health, “Indigenous Children and the Child Welfare System in Canada” (2017) at 5. 
61 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, “First Nations Child and Family Services Agencies”, online: 
<fncaringsociety.com/agencies?title=&field_address_administrative_area=&field_address_locality=&distance%5Bd
istance%5D=100&distance%5Bunit%5D=6371&distance%5Borigin%5D=> [perma.cc/2WWJ-BRZH]. 
62 Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 46: “[INAC] also has agreements with the provinces of Alberta and British 
Columbia to provide child and family services to certain First Nations reserves. A similar agreement is also in place 
with the Yukon Territory.” 
63 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, From Red Tape to Clear Results: The Report of the Independent Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs (Ottawa: Treasury Board, 2006) at 3 [Blue Ribbon Report]. 
64 This particular language from Schedule DIAND-3 of the 2016–2017 Funding Agreement for First Nations and 
Tribal Councils. 
65 DIAND/First Nation Funding Agreement, 2007–2008, clauses 4.6 and 4.7. 
66 See Saskatchewan v STC Health & Family Services Inc, 2016 SKQB 236 at para 21. 
67 Grants are often used when governments fund projects in the business or academic context. They have little to no 
conditions attached and require less accounting and oversight (see Blue Ribbon Report, supra note 63 at 20). 
68 Canada uses inter-governmental transfers to transfer funds for such things as equalization payments and the social 
and health transfers to the provinces and territories. Such transfers are unconditional and the lines of accountability 
for spending these funds are between the government receiving the funds and its citizens. The provinces receiving 
the payments are free to spend the money in accordance with their own priorities (see: Blue Ribbon Report, supra 
note 63 at 9, 20; Hogg, supra note 12, ch 6 at 10). 
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can spend surplus funds; however, the vast majority of agreements with First Nations and 
FNCFS Agencies are one-year agreements.69 It is Canada who determines what type of 
agreement a First Nation or FNCFS Agency can enter.70 In conclusion to Part I, the anomalous 
nature of First Nations essential services needs to be underscored. For other Canadians, the 
provinces readily assume jurisdiction, pass laws and policies regarding particular services, and 
fund and employ public servants to deliver these services. By contrast, on reserve, neither 
Canada nor the provinces want responsibility, but the federal government funds the service, 
provincial laws define the service, and First Nations and FNCFS Agencies provide the service 
through program devolution. It is a complex and convoluted system, as well as one that is 
dysfunctional and causes significant harm to First Nations, as we turn to next. 
 
II. THE CARING SOCIETY CASE AND THE HARMS OF THE 
FNCFS PROGRAM 
 
Dr. Cindy Blackstock is a Gitxan woman, a social worker, Executive Director of the First 
Nations Child and Caring Society, and a tireless advocate on behalf of First Nations children. Dr. 
Blackstock was a child protection worker for a provincial child and family services agency for 
eight years before she joined a FNCFS Agency operated by the Squamish First Nation, where 
she worked for several years before joining the Caring Society.71 Comparing her experience 
working in the provincial system with the First Nations child welfare system, Dr. Blackstock 
quickly realized the profound inequities of the system on reserve and the harms this was causing 
to First Nations children and families.72 She would go on to collaborate with other First Nations 
child welfare experts, to produce two reports outlining the problems of the FNCFS Program, in 
particular problems in its funding formulas.73 INAC co-commissioned these reports with the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN), but did little to implement the full extent of their 
recommendations. In 2008, Canada developed a new funding formula, called the Enhanced 
Prevention Focused Approach (EPFA), and slowly began implementing it in some regions of the 
country. The EPFA, however, was only a slight improvement over Directive 20-1 and continued 
to perpetuate inequities in the FNCFS.74  
Given the lack of commitment by Canada to make real reform, Dr. Blackstock and the 
AFN filed a human rights complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 2007. 
Specifically, the complaint alleged that funding of child welfare services on reserve is 
                                                          
69 The longer agreements are called “Block Funding Agreements” and the one-year agreements are called 
“Comprehensive Funding Agreements” (CFAs). Bands in Block Funding Agreements are also given additional 
flexibility to keep any surplus funds within certain conditions; those in CFAs have no such flexibility (see Institute 
of Governance, “Special Study on INAC’s Funding Arrangements: Final Report” (22 December 2008) at 11–13 
[IOG Report]). 
70 To do this, INAC undertakes an assessment of First Nations and FNCFS Agencies’ capacity and accountability 
and determines the degree of risk for financial mismanagement (for more information see INAC, “General 
Assessment,” online: <aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1322761862008/1322762014207> [perma.cc/626D-AGRP]. 
71 Cindy Blackstock, “The Complainant: The Canadian Human Rights Case on First Nations Child Welfare,” (2016) 
62 McGill LJ 285. 
72 Ibid at 291–93. 
73 Ibid at 293–95 
74 Ibid at 295–97. 
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inequitable and insufficient, and that FNCFS Agencies on reserve receive significantly less 
funding than agencies funded by the provinces.75 
Based on many of the harms identified below (though the Tribunal did not attempt to 
exhaustively address all the harms as I do here), and finding that these were based on the 
protected characteristics of race and/or national ethnic origin,76 the Tribunal concluded that the 
FNCFS Program is discriminatory and called on Canada to “REFORM”77 its child welfare 
program. To appreciate the implications of the decision discussed in Part III, it is important to 
understand how problems with the FNCFS Program relate to the three structural features 
highlighted in Part I (jurisdictional neglect, provincial accountability, and program devolution). 
Therefore, this Part itemizes the various harms caused by each of these features. Finally, I review 
cumulative harms resulting from the FNCFS Program as a whole.  
 
A. HARMS ARISING FROM JURISDICTIONAL NEGLECT 
 
Jurisdictional neglect results not only in a failure to properly address important First Nations 
policy issues (discussed more in the next section), but, curiously, can also result in excessive or 
inappropriate control exercised over First Nations by INAC. This is due to an absence of the 
normal checks and balances that come with properly regulated government services established 
through legislation. Canada has steadfastly refused to legislate in this area. While Canada could 
legislate in respect of First Nations child welfare, until very recently it has displayed zero interest 
in doing so.78 
Since 1994, the Auditor General of Canada has been raising concerns about the lack of 
legislative frameworks for program delivery on reserve. The Auditor General has linked the 
absence of legislation with ambiguity in key program terms, such as “comparability,” which 
creates a risk of underfunding of services. The Auditor General has also suggested that an 
                                                          
75 John Loxley et al, “Wen:de: The Journey Continues,” 1st ed (Ottawa: First Nations Child and Family Caring 
Society of Canada, 2005) at 133, 189. (The 2005 study undertaken by Dr. Blackstock and other researchers pegged 
the shortfall between federal and provincial funding at approximately 30 per cent). 
76 Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 395–98. 
77 Ibid at para 463 [emphasis in original]. 
78 The proposal for specific federal legislation over First Nations child welfare has been floated since at least the late 
1970s. See British Columbia Native Women’s Society, “Proposal for Recommended Legislative Enactment with 
Respect to Rights for Native Indian Children and Protection of Native Indian Children by Independent Indian 
Bands” (Kamploops: 1979), cited in Johnston, supra note 10, ch 4 at note 1. Johnston similarly recommends federal 
legislation as the best option for change (at 85–88). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 2015 Calls to 
Action #4 specifically calls upon the federal government to enact Aboriginal child welfare legislation that 
establishes national standards for Aboriginal child apprehension and custody cases (see Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (Winnipeg: 2015), online: 
<www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf> [perma.cc/SEZ5-SKF2] 
[TRC, “Calls”]). In response to this and a proposal that such legislation could recognize and implement First 
Nations’ self-government over child welfare similar to the Indian Child Welfare Act of the United States (see 
Grammond, supra note 12), Canada has publicly announced interest in exploring such legislation (see Tasker, supra 
note 3). 
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absence of legislation makes it difficult to hold INAC accountable to Parliament.79 In 2011, the 
Auditor General went so far as to say that these structural problems in the delivery of essential 
services “severely limit the delivery of public services to First Nations communities and hinder 
improvements in living conditions on reserves.”80 
An important element of the rule of law in Canada is that governments must publish laws 
so that individuals know the rules that bind both citizens and government.81 One of the benefits 
of this is greater clarity about the substantive norms to be followed in the delivery of programs 
and services. The absence of a federal legislative framework for First Nations child welfare has 
resulted in significant ambiguity around several important standards. For example, INAC has no 
clear definition of “comparability” and this has allowed it to take varying and sometimes 
inconsistent positions on its meaning at different times.82 As discussed further below, Canada’s 
interpretation of “comparability” around funding has facilitated the long-term underfunding of 
child welfare services. Another example is INAC’s program objective of providing “culturally 
appropriate” child and family services. In Caring Society, the Tribunal found that INAC does not 
know what “culturally appropriate” means and is currently not providing such services.83 
INAC also lacks legislated overall objectives about its relationship to First Nations 
people.84 As a result, the Department vacillates between different objectives at different times. At 
times, INAC sees its role as achieving improved outcomes for First Nations,85 including 
advocating and advising First Nations in their transition to self-government.86 At other times, 
INAC has seen itself as responsible for monitoring First Nations and ensuring they are compliant 
with minimum program standards under funding agreements and filing all necessary reports. The 
                                                          
79 Auditor General of Canada, 1994 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, vol 14, 
Chapter 23, “Indian and Northern Affairs Canada: Social Assistance” [Auditor General 1994 Report]; Auditor 
General of Canada, 2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 5, “Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada: Education Program and Post-Secondary Student Report” [Auditor General 2004 
Report]; Auditor General of Canada, 2006 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 5, “Management of 
Programs for First Nations”; Auditor General of Canada, 2008 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the 
House of Commons, Chapter 4, “First Nations Child and Family Services Program: Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada” [Auditor General 2008 Report]; Auditor General of Canada, 2013 Status Report of the Auditor General of 
Canada, Chapter 6, “Emergency Management on Reserves” [Auditor General 2013 Report]. 
80 Auditor General of Canada, 2011 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, 
Chapter 4, “Programs for First Nations on Reserves” at 4 [Auditor General 2011 Report]. 
81 See Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Administrative Aboriginal Law” in Colleen M Flood & 
Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed (Emond Publishing: Toronto, 2017) at 101–08. 
82 For example, when it comes to comparability to substantive provincial laws, Canada took the position (starting in 
2011) that this required the delivery of essential services to mirror provincial law (see Simon v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2012 FC 387, aff’d 2012 FCA 312 (interlocutory injunction); 2013 FC 1117, rev’d 2015 FCA 18 (merits), 
leave to appeal to SCC denied). However, with respect to comparability to provincial funding, Canada took the 
position that comparability does not require INAC to mirror or provide similar service levels to the provinces, but is 
only required to maintain comparable funding levels to the provinces (see: Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 338; 
Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada, 2013 FC 342). 
83 Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 423–26. 
84 There is no substantive guidance provided in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Act, 
RSC 1985, c I-6. All that exists therein is a bare grant of power to the Minister and her Department over “Indian 
Affairs” (see ss 2(1), 4). 
85 See e.g. INAC, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “National Social Programs Manual” 
(Canada: 2012) at 12. 
86 IOG Report, supra note 69 at 30. 
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two functions are fundamentally at odds with each other.87 Moreover, the lack of clear legislative 
guidance appears to have made the Department prioritize its monitoring functions. Evaluations 
of the Department from the late 2000s found that INAC resources were increasingly being used 
for monitoring and compliance and that staff were primarily focused on their policies and 
programs, not the priorities of First Nations.88 
The above illustrates how the absence of legislation gives INAC significant discretion. 
This can give rise to the possibility of arbitrary decision-making and abuse of power.89 For 
example, lack of clear standards and controls on state power can embolden some in government 
to retaliate against First Nations people and organizations who challenge them. Dr. Blackstock 
and the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society both faced retaliatory actions for filing 
the human rights complaint against Canada. The Caring Society had all of its federal funding cut. 
Dr. Blackstock was barred entry from a meeting with Canada, which the Tribunal found to 
constitute retaliation, and she was the subject of extensive government surveillance in the hopes 
of finding information to discredit her and the case.90 
Legislation can also provide clear mechanisms for dispute resolution and, consequently, 
its absence can make access to justice more difficult. Currently, it is difficult for First Nations 
and FNCFS Agencies to challenge Canada’s decisions on child welfare. First, because their 
funding agreements do not allow them to bring concerns about funding and reporting 
requirements to dispute resolution.91 Second, courts are uneasy about intervening when there is 
no legislative framework underlying a dispute. Administrative law principles suggest courts 
ought to be very deferential to governments in cases where they make policy decisions and 
exercise discretion outside legislation.92 In one case, involving INAC’s decision to cut funding to 
a First Nations Tribal Council that had been providing child and family prevention services for 
twenty years, the judge suggested that INAC’s decision was immune from review because it did 
not arise from legislation.93 
Such barriers in accessing justice are in addition to significant resourcing imbalance 
between Canada and First Nations when it comes to litigation. Many First Nations lack the 
financial resources to proceed with legal action. Canada also tends to vigorously defend such 
actions and this can serve to increase legal costs significantly. INAC has consistently had the 
highest litigation budget of any other federal department for the past ten years.94 Canada 
                                                          
87 The Penner Report made this observation as early as 1983: “There is a fundamental conflict between the 
monitoring and advisory roles of DIAND employees” (Penner Report, supra note 7 at 92). 
88 See INAC, Departmental Audit and Evaluation Branch, “Evaluation of the Alternative Funding Arrangement 
(AFA) and Flexible Transfer Payment (FTP) Funding Authorities” (December 2005) at 28 [2005 Evaluation 
Report]; IOG Report, supra note 69 at 39. 
89 See Promislow & Metallic, supra note 81 at 101–02. 
90 Blackstock, supra note 71 at 301, 315–20; see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v 
Attorney General of Canada, 2015 CHRT 14. 
91 See INAC: First Nations and Tribal Councils National Funding Agreement Model for 2018–2019, clause 12.3.1. 
92 The logic of this principle is problematic when Canada deliberately chooses not to legislate over First Nations (see 
Promislow & Metallic, supra note 81 at 104–08). 
93 See Lac Seul First Nation v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development), 2004 FC 1183 at para 
13. 
94 In some years, 2015–2016, its legal fees were double that of the department with the second-highest litigation 
budget: the Canada Revenue Agency, which unlike INAC, actually has a mandate to pursue litigation (against 
taxpayers who avoid paying taxes) (see: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “INAC Legal Fees”, online: 
<www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1359569904612/1359569939970> [perma.cc/3D3P-984S]; Public Services and 
Procurement Canada, “Public Accounts for Canada, 2016, Vol. III, Section 3—Professional and Special Services”, 
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aggressively defended the Caring Society case, seeking to block the complaint at almost every 
turn.95 But for the perseverance of Dr. Blackstock and AFN, and the legal team that assisted 
them on a pro-bono basis, this watershed case might have been abandoned.96 Canada had spent 
nearly eight million dollars on the case leading up to main decision.97 Since the main decision up 
to 30 November 2017, Canada had spent an additional 1.2 million dollars on legal fees.98  
 
B. HARMS ARISING FROM PROVINCIAL COMPARABILITY 
 
1. COMPARABILITY TO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
 
Provincial comparability renders First Nations child welfare services assimilative in nature. First, 
as seen in Part I, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the federal Joint Committee 
emphasized the integration of Indians into mainstream society. Having the provinces and 
territories assume greater and greater responsibility over First Nations was key in this regard. 
Although the federal government came up short in persuading the provinces to assume full 
responsibility over First Nations essential services, having provincial laws set the substantive 
service norms (either directly or indirectly) achieves a significant part of this objective. Thus, 
although with its withdrawal of the White Paper, Canada officially declared an end to its 
assimilation policy in 1971, the policy of assimilation nonetheless continues to run through 
Canada’s program delivery to First Nations based on the comparability standard.99 
Next, by allowing provincial laws to apply on reserve, Canada effectively abdicates any 
policy-making function over First Nations issues to the provinces—governments that were 
historically quite removed from First Nations issues and who resisted assumption of jurisdiction 
over social services on reserve (and in many cases continue to do so). Where Canada imposes 
provincial standards indirectly through the comparability standard, such as in regards to social 
assistance, the provinces have no policy or legal basis to concern themselves with how their laws 
may affect First Nations.100 In the case of child welfare, however, where provincial legislators 
have accepted that their laws directly apply there is a stronger policy and legal basis for the 
province to care. To this end, in recent years we have seen increased efforts at provincial and 
First Nations cooperation in the area of child welfare. A scan of current provincial/territorial 
child welfare legislation for Indigenous-specific provisions (see chart at Appendix C) shows that 
a number of provinces have made specific accommodations within their child welfare legislation 
for First Nations. Nonetheless, Canada’s abdication to provincial law-making over First Nations 
child welfare remains problematic. 
First, this approach results in a wide variance of standards applicable to First Nations 
child welfare. Some provinces’ laws include significant accommodations of First Nations interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
online: <epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/html/2016/recgen/cpc-pac/2016/vol3/ds3/index-
eng.html> [perma.cc/X2V5-VSB2]. 
95 See First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v Attorney General 
of Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2011 CHRT 4; Canada (Human 
Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 445, aff’d 2013 FCA 75. 
96 For more on this see Blackstock, supra note 71 at 303–08. 
97 Ibid at 302. 
98 See Canada, Department of Justice, Access to Information Requests A-2017-01473; see also supra note 3 
regarding the further hearings following the main decision. 
99 See Shewell & Spagnut, supra note 21 at 6. 
100 Ibid at 43. 
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(BC, AB, ON and YK), some have a few (NS, NT, PEI, QC and SK), and some contain 
relatively minor or no accommodations (MB, NB and NL). Not only does this create disparity 
between different Indigenous nations, it can lead to disparities in the treatment of children from 
the same nation, if communities from the nation straddle different provincial or territorial 
borders. In its Final Report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission stressed the need for 
greater consistency in the regulatory framework that guides the work of Indigenous child welfare 
authorities in Canada, emphasizing that, “[e]stablishing national standards is the first step 
towards developing greater consistency in decision-making and ensuring that overrepresentation 
is reduced and that culturally appropriate placements become the norm.”101 
Next is the prospect that provinces may be constitutionally limited in the extent to which 
they can accommodate First Nations. Our constitutional law permits provincial laws of general 
application to apply to First Nations. However, such laws are not permitted to “single out” First 
Nations.102 Although the Supreme Court has recently signalled flexibility in what constitutes 
“singling out,” stating that simply referencing “Aboriginal” in a provincial law will not constitute 
“singling out,” this doctrine may still be seen as a proscription by provinces on accommodating 
specific First Nations interest.103 In this regard, Quebec recently cited constitutional constraints 
as limiting the extent to which it could legislate in respect of Indigenous customary adoptions.104  
Even where a provincial law may contain some accommodations for First Nations, the 
fact is many general provincial laws and policies apply to First Nations and these run the risk of 
being culturally inappropriate. In this regard, Johnston argues that differences in values between 
First Nations and Europeans contribute to the problems in First Nations child welfare:  
 
A system of child welfare is based on certain beliefs held by members of the dominant 
culture. Those beliefs evolve into normative standards of child rearing and define which 
practices should be considered good or bad, proper or improper. A problem arises if one set 
of standards is applied to a group with a different set of norms. Several observers have 
suggested that this is precisely what has happened to Native people, not only in Canada but 
in other countries as well, as they come into contact with child welfare services. A different 
approach to child rearing may have resulted in Native people receiving inappropriate and, 
perhaps, even discriminatory treatment by the child welfare system.105 
 
                                                          
101 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Canada’s Residential Schools: The Legacy, vol 5 (Montreal: 
McGill Queen’s University Press, 2015) at 55 [TRC, “Legacy”]. The Commission’s Call to Action #4 calls upon the 
federal government to establish national standards for Aboriginal child apprehension and custody cases (see TRC, 
“Calls,” supra note 78). 
102 This is the rule that provincial laws cannot create special rules for Indians (whether for ameliorative or adverse 
purposes). See R v Sutherland, [1980] 2 SCR 451; Leighton v British Columbia, [1989] 4 WWR 654; Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia, [1997] 2 SCR 1010 at para 179. 
103 See Kitkatla Band v British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism & Culture), 2002 SCC 31 at para 66. 
Post-Kitkatla, it would still appear that provincial legislation giving special treatment specifically to Aboriginal 
people would be ultra vires. But see Jean Leclair, “The Kitkatla Decision: Finding Jurisdictional Room to Justify 
Provincial Regulation of Aboriginal Matters,” (2003) 21 Sup Ct LR (2d) 73, who argues that, without saying so, the 
Court all but did away with the “singling out” rule in Kitkatla. See also NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society 
v B C Government and Service Employees' Union, 2010 SCC 45 at para 41 [NIL/TU,O], where Abella J seemingly 
endorsed specific accommodation of First Nations interests in provincial child welfare legislation. However, the 
case was about labour jurisdiction and the “singling out” doctrine was not raised. 
104 Quebec, National Assembly, Committee on Institutions, Recognition of Effects of First Nations Customary 
Adoption in and for the Purposes of Quebec Legislation (23 November 2016) at 9. 
105 Johnston, supra note 10 at 71. 
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Johnston details how, with respect to child rearing, First Nations have a distinct and 
unique value system manifested in customs and traditions that have been passed down from 
generation to generation, and these approaches to child rearing may still prevail in First Nations 
communities. He discusses many, including a pacifistic approach to socializing and disciplining 
children, often seen negatively by Euro-Canadian as “permissive” parenting; having a broader 
concept of “family” that includes grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, et cetera.; as well as the 
prioritization of relationships and kinship over material possessions.106 All of these values can 
clash with Euro-Canadian values embedded in provincial child welfare law. 
In addition to difference in values, First Nations can have particular needs or 
circumstances that may differ significantly from other populations in the province, and which 
provincial laws may poorly accommodate. This includes intergenerational trauma from 
residential schools and other colonial policies, as well as living in poverty (which the current 
system for program delivery exacerbates). In this regard, there is empirical research suggesting 
that First Nations poverty paired with Euro-Canadian norms on child rearing is resulting in First 
Nations children being disproportionately apprehended on the grounds of “neglect.”107  
The purpose of this section is to highlight the problems of the federal government’s 
choice of provincial comparability as it relates to law-making over services on reserve, including 
over child welfare, and the harms it causes First Nations. This should not be construed, however, 
as a proposal for a federal law drafted by federal politicians and bureaucrats intended to 
substantively replace and be paramount over all provincial and territorial child welfare laws vis-
à-vis First Nations. Such a law would run the risk of being equally culturally inappropriate and 
paternalistic as any provincial law, as a law designed by outsiders. Such a law would also run 
counter to the wisdom of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,108 the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,109 several scholars,110 federal government reports,111 and First 
Nations peoples who have all recognized that returning control to First Nations over key aspects 
of their day-to-day lives through the exercise of self-government is the key to improving 
Indigenous peoples’ living conditions and countering the impacts of colonialism. There is, 
                                                          
106 Ibid at 65–76. 
107 See Vandna Sinha, Ashleigh Delaye & Brittany Orav-Lakaski, “Reimagining Overrepresentation Research: 
Critical Reflections on Researching Overrepresentation of First Nations Children in the Child Welfare System” 
(2018) 28 JL & Soc Pol’y 28; David Rothwell et al, “Explaining the Economic Disparity Gap in the Rate of 
Substantiated Child Maltreatment in Canada,” (2018) 28 JL & Soc Pol’y 28; and Vandna Sinha, Stephen Ellenbogen 
& Nico Trocmé, “Substantiating Neglect of First Nations and Non-Aboriginal Children” (2013) 35:12 Children & 
Youth Services Review 2080. 
108 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Gathering 
Strength, vol 3 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 2. 
109 TRC, “Legacy,” supra note 101 at 60. 
110 See John H Hylton, “The Case for Self-Government: A Social Policy Perspective” in John H Hylton, ed, 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 
1999) at 78; John O’Neil et al, “Community Healing and Aboriginal Self-Government” in John H Hylton, ed, 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 
1999) at 130; Rae, supra note 48 at 3; Sonia Harris-Short, Aboriginal Child Welfare, Self-Government and the 
Rights of Indigenous Children: Protecting the Vulnerable Under International Law (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2012) at 11–12. 
111 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Evaluation, Performance Measurement, and Review Branch Audit and 
Evaluation Sector, “Final Report Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Implementation of Self- Government and 
Self-Government Agreements—Project Number: 07065” (February 2011): “Empirical research shows that taking 
control of selected powers of self-government and capable governance institutions are indispensable tools to 
successful long-term community development in Aboriginal communities” at 41. 
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however, a potential role for the federal government here in clearing a legislative path to allow 
for effective implementation of self-government by First Nations as has been done in the United 
States,112 as well as providing adequate funding. A proposal for similar federal legislation over 
First Nations child welfare in Canada has recently been proposed.113 
 
2. COMPARABILITY TO PROVINCIAL FUNDING 
 
As noted in Part I, Canada is authorized under Treasury Board approvals to fund child welfare 
services on a level “comparable” with the provinces. Canada has no legislated definition of this 
term, leaving it wide open to interpretation by Department staff. When it comes to funding, it has 
not been interpreted in a generous way. Although INAC says it provides funding for comparable 
services, indeed, several reports suggest otherwise. Numerous Auditor General of Canada reports 
have found that the Department in fact does not know—and does not track—whether it is 
funding a comparable level of services compared to the provinces. Such findings have been 
made with respect to virtually all First Nations essential services areas funded by Canada.114 The 
Auditor General’s 2008 report on Child Welfare stated: “We found that INAC has not analyzed 
and compared the child welfare services available on reserve with those in neighbouring 
communities off-reserve.”115 Based on the Auditor General findings and other significant reports, 
the Tribunal in Caring Society found that INAC had indeed failed to study and ensure that First 
Nations receive levels of service comparable to the provinces.116 The Tribunal also found that 
INAC often arbitrarily denied funding for similar kinds of prevention services available within 
provincial systems.117 
Internal INAC reports cited in the Caring Society case show that staff within the 
Department were aware that their services did not measure up to the provinces. In a 2006 
document entitled Explanation on Expenditures of Social Development Programs, the 
Department described all of its social programs as “… limited in scope and not designed to be as 
effective as they need to be to create positive social change or meet basic needs in some 
circumstances.”118 It goes on to say that if current social programs were administered by the 
provinces this would result in a significant increase in costs for INAC.119 A policy that 
contributed to the underfunding of First Nations essential services in the last two decades was a 
two per cent cap on growth in funding for First Nations program. Instituted by Canada in 1996 as 
temporary deficit reduction strategy, the cap stayed in place for over twenty years—long after 
                                                          
112 See TRC, “Legacy,” supra note 101 at 54–56. See also John Borrows, “Legislation and Indigenous Self-
Determination in Canada and the United States” in Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition 
to Reconciliation: Essays on The Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal And Treaty Rights (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2016) at 474. 
113 See Grammond, supra note 12. 
114 On social assistance, see Auditor General 1994 Report, supra note 79 at para 23.48; on education, see Auditor 
General 2004 Report, supra note 79 at para 5.50; on emergency services, see Auditor General 2013 Report, supra 
note 79 at 3; and on policing, see Auditor General of Canada, 2014 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 
Chapter 5, “First Nations Policing Program—Public Safety Canada” at 5.23–.25. 
115 Auditor General 2008 Report, supra note 79 at para 4.19. 
116 Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 335–36, 338, 393, 462, 464. 
117 Ibid at para 230. 
118 Quoted in ibid at para 267. 
119 Ibid. 
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other austerity measures instituted in this period were eliminated.120 This would have resulted in 
annual funding to First Nations being capped at arbitrary numbers, not reflecting population 
growth, demand for services, or even inflation.121  
Beyond evidence that federal funding does not generally keep pace, there is evidence that 
INAC has not reviewed or amended the funding formulas for a number of its specific programs 
for well over a decade, including with respect to the FNCFS Program.122 With regard to the 
FNCFS Program, the Tribunal in Caring Society found that INAC funding formulas are based on 
flawed assumptions on the percentages of children in care and families using services, and are 
not regularly reviewed or updated to reflect inflation/cost of living. Consequently, these formulas 
result in the underfunding of prevention services, which create a perverse incentive to remove 
children from their homes as a first resort instead of a last resort.123  
 
C. HARMS ARISING FROM PROGRAM DEVOLUTION 
 
This structural feature creates an immense power imbalance between Canada and First Nations. 
First Nations and FNCFS Agencies largely have no say in the content of their agreements. These 
are standard form agreements prepared by INAC, often sent too close to the signing deadline to 
permit for meaningful discussion between the Department and First Nations.124 Hence, there is 
no real negotiation and these agreements are a "take it or leave it" proposition.”125 Further, most 
First Nations are not in a position to “leave it” since most lack sufficient own-sources revenues 
to sustain their communities, and these agreements are for basic, essential services programs that 
the community cannot do without.126 Funds from the Department can also come late, resulting in 
service delays or First Nations and FNCFS incurring large debt financing to cover the gap.127  
Excessive reporting requirements under the funding agreements are also a problem.128 To 
give a sense of the numbers of reports a First Nation must file with INAC a 2002 Auditor 
General’s report found that the average First Nation was required to complete 168 reports 
annually just to keep funding for basic services flowing to their community.129 Since this time, 
Canada has made efforts to decrease reporting requirements.130 However, a 2011 report by the 
                                                          
120 Scott Serson, “Reconciliation: For First Nations This Must Include First Fairness” in Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation, Response, Responsibility, and Renewal: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Journey (Ottawa, AHF, 
2009) 147 at 150–51. 
121 For more information, see INAC “Cost Drivers Study,” quoted in Rae, supra note 48 at 27, footnote 107. 
122 See 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 88 at 16. 
123 See Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 344. 
124 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 88 at 18. 
125 IOG Report, supra note 69 at 31. See also Attawapiskat First Nation v Canada, 2012 FC 948 at para 59. 
126 As stated by Chief Casey Ratt of Barriere Lake Nation, Quebec: “Now signing off mean we don’t get any dollars 
for our community for I don’t know how long. At the present time…we don’t have any economic opportunities as 
some other First Nations communities do; we’re pretty isolated,” in David P Ball, “‘A Gun to Our Heads’ Pressure 
to Sign New Funding Agreement More Widespread Than First Thought,” Windspeaker (2013) 31:1. See also Barb 
Pacholik, “Peepeekisis Cree Nation Members Gather on Highway to Protest Federal Funding Agreement”, Regina 
Leader-Post (24 March 2016), online: <leaderpost.com/news/national/peepeekisis-cree-nation-members-gather-on-
highway-to-protest-federal-funding-agreement> [perma.cc/45MV-QPJT].  
127 See IOG Report, supra note 69 at 2. See also 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 88 at 24. 
128 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 88 at 19; IOG Report, supra note 69 at 43. 
129 Auditor General of Canada, 2002 December Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, 
Chapter 1, “Streamlining First Nations Reporting to Federal Organizations” at 8. 
130 INAC, “Oversight of Transfer Payments: AANDC’s Risk-Based Approach FMI Workshop Presentation” 
(Toronto: 4 June 2013) at 4. 
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Auditor General of Canada concluded that INAC’s attempts to reduce reporting had been 
unsatisfactory.131 Excessive reporting requirements can strain the capacity of First Nations and 
FNCFS Agencies.132  
The stakes are high if reporting requirements are not met. Late reporting triggers a 
possible default under the funding agreements and intervention by INAC up to or including 
withholding funds or terminating an agreement.133 In 2016, INAC threatened to terminate 
funding for a FNCFS Agency that was alleged to be behind on reporting. This further triggered 
the province to intervene and terminate the Agency’s delegation agreement and send its own 
child welfare authorities into the First Nations that had been served by the Agency for twenty 
years.134 There have also been reports about INAC staff occasionally losing or misplacing 
reports, resulting in funding being halted because of INAC’s error.135 
Studies show that although there is a proliferation of reporting, the data obtained by 
INAC is not being used to help build sustainable capacity within First Nations,136 or to improve 
outcomes in communities.137 In particular, one study found that INAC evaluations rarely focus 
on the program beneficiaries or their long-term goals. Instead, INAC was primarily preoccupied 
with providing accounts to the federal governments on dollars spent.138 The Institute on 
Governance has suggested that poor and irrelevant data analysis is depriving Parliament of 
information that could be used to improve the circumstances of First Nations.139 First Nations 
themselves have also questioned the value of all of their reporting to INAC, as they do not 
receive any feedback on their reports and they are not being used to increase funding.140  
These various problems with funding agreements have been known for some time. The 
1983 Penner Report argued that in order for First Nations governments to effectively govern the 
affairs of their people, their funding relationships with the federal government need to be on the 
same level as transfer agreements between the federal government and provincial governments, 
that is, unconditional.141 The 1996 RCAP Report urged Canada to embrace a new fiscal 
relationship with First Nations and to replace existing funding agreements with ones that support 
meaningful and effective self-government based on the principles of self-reliance, equity, 
efficiency, accountability, and harmonization.142 More recently, in 2006, an Independent Blue 
                                                          
131 Auditor General 2011 Report, supra note 80 at 4. 
132 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: 
Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 408 [RCAP, vol 2]; IOG 
Report, supra note 69 at 42. 
133 See INAC, “Default Preventions and Management Policy 2013,” online: <aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1386790074541/1386790301856#chp5-3> [perma.cc/M8DW-GAME]; Shiri Pasternak, 
“Mercenary Colonialism: Third-party Management”, Ricochet (25 October 2017), online: 
<ricochet.media/en/1994/mercenary-colonialism-third-party-management> [perma.cc/7RSE-HRYM]. 
134 See Saskatchewan v STC Health & Family Services Inc, 2016 SKQB 236; the matter continues to be before the 
courts. 
135 IOG Report, supra note 69 at 43. 
136 Ibid at 2. 
137 2005 Evaluation Report, supra note 88 at 21–22; IOG Report, supra note 69 at 2, 33. 
138 Steve Jacob & Geoffroy Desautels, “Evaluation of Aboriginal Programs: What Place is Given to Participation 
and Cultural Sensitivity?,” online: (2013) 4:2 International Indigenous Policy Journal 1 at 16 
<ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=iipj> 
[perma.cc/D6NS-NJLQ]. 
139 IOG Report, supra note 69 at 37. 
140 Ibid at 43. 
141 Penner Report, supra note 7 at 89. 
142 RCAP, vol 2, supra note 132 at 267–69. 
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Ribbon Panel tasked with evaluating Canada’s grants and contribution program, found the use of 
contribution arrangements with First Nations to be “fraught with problems and [leading] to a 
costly and unnecessary reporting burden on recipients.”143 The Panel suggested that fiscal 
arrangements with First Nations should be treated more like intergovernmental transfers rather 
than typical contribution arrangements.144 A 2008 Institute on Governance special study on 
INAC funding agreements concluded that contribution agreements were not appropriate vehicles 
for funding First Nations, listing several of the problems identified here and in the previous 
section around funding.145 A 2011 report from the Auditor General concluded likewise.146  
Despite several reports raising alarm bells over a thirty-year period, Canada has been 
resistant to move away from contribution agreements.147 Even Canada’s most recent 
commitment to transforming fiscal relations with First Nations does not appear to contemplate 
alternatives to contribution agreements.148 Critics have argued that Canada’s resistance stems 
from deeply engrained paternalism.149 
Public misconception about program devolution has in fact helped entrench such 
paternalism by perpetuating stereotypes that First Nations leaders and organizations are either 
corrupt or incompetent and ultimately responsible for the poverty and social problems in their 
communities.150 Many Canadians subscribe to the false narrative that large sums of taxpayers’ 
money have been invested in First Nations communities (i.e., that “pots of money” have been 
thrown at First Nations issues by successive governments over a number of decades).151 To 
someone on the outside, knowing little to nothing about First Nations and program issues on 
reserve, this is perhaps what devolution may look like. For many who hold this erroneous 
assumption, when they are confronted with stories of abject poverty and related social and health 
problems on reserve, instead of questioning their assumptions about the “pots of money,” they 
instead prefer to believe that First Nations leaders have somehow stolen or mismanaged the “pots 
                                                          
143 Blue Ribbon Report, supra note 63 at 8. 
144 Ibid. 
145 IOG Report, supra note 69 at 2. 
146 Auditor General 2011 Report, supra note 80 at 3. 
147 See e.g. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (Audit and Evaluation Sector), Special Study: 
Evolving Funding Arrangements with First Nations, Final Report (November 2011), prepared by Donna Cona Inc. 
(The report dismissed out-of-hand the suggestion that agreements akin to intergovernmental agreements could be 
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funding comes via the transfer and that they consequently have almost none of their residents' own money to 
account for” at 39). 
148 See Canada and the Assembly of First Nations, A New Approach: Co-Development of a New Fiscal Relationship 
between Canada and First Nations (2018), online: <aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-
ACH/STAGING/texte-text/reconciliation_new_fiscal_rel_approach_1512565483826_eng.pdf> [perma.cc/T65K-
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Globe and Mail (4 January 2016). 
150 One need only read the comment section of any online news story about conditions on reserve to become 
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Including First Nations Politicians”, National Post (16 January 2016); Lois Frank, Harley Frank & Todd MacKay, 
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of money” or lack the competency or capacity to manage their own affairs.152 Research findings 
show that such stereotypes have directly impacted public perceptions of FNCFS Agencies.153 
Although many have lauded the objectives of program devolution as encouraging greater 
First Nations control, others have argued it was intended as a subtle way to achieve goals similar 
to those outlined in the White Paper.154 Whether well-intended or not, Judith Rae argues that it 
has been in place too long.155 She argues that because of underfunding and weak progress 
towards genuine self-government, program devolution is not functioning as a transitional tool to 
self-government, but only making matters worse. It is a “quagmire” in which a dysfunctional, 
unjust, and ineffective system is entrenched, causing untold damage to First Nations people who 
rely on the system’s programs and services, and creating its own obstacles to positive change.156  
 
D. HARMS ARISING FROM THE FNCFS PROGRAM AS A WHOLE 
 
Structural problems inherent to the FNCFS Program (and, indeed, all other essential services on 
reserve), wreak serious socio-economic harms on First Nations children, families, and 
communities. First and foremost, the system exacerbates the poverty that already exists in First 
Nations as a result of colonial policies.157 The Auditor General recognized this in 2011 when she 
observed that structural problems in program delivery on reserve hinder improvements in living 
conditions on reserves.158 In a 2014 report, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
people stated that “the human rights problems faced by Indigenous peoples in Canada … have 
reached crisis proportions in many respect” and that “[t]he most jarring manifestation of these 
human rights problems is the distressing socio-economic conditions of indigenous peoples in a 
highly developed country.”159  
As noted earlier, First Nations poverty is often a significant factor in the apprehension of 
First Nations children.160 There are several other services funded by Canada that are intended to 
ameliorate the health and well-being of First Nations children and families, such as social 
assistance, housing, education, and health, which are all interconnected with child welfare. If 
these services are also underfunded and dysfunctional, it follows that there will be more child 
                                                          
152 Indeed, it was a barely concealed message in many statements and actions of the Harper government, where 
Ministers would lament the “billions of dollars” spent on Indigenous issues as a basis for refusing requests for 
additional spending and commenting “let’s get value for the money we are currently spending” [see Assembly of 
First Nations, “Fiscal Fairness for First Nations” (2006)]. 
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155 Ibid at 22–23. 
156 Ibid at 3. 
157 The crushing poverty experienced by many residents on reserve is supported by INAC’s Community Well-Being 
Index, which reveals a persistent 20-point gap between First Nations and non-Aboriginal communities for over 30 
years. See INAC, “Ministerial Transition Book: November 2015”, online: <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1450197908882/1450197959844> [perma.cc/WTT9-F8J8]. 
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26
Metallic: Issue 2: A Human Right to Self-Government over First Nations Chil
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018
  
welfare interventions and apprehensions, especially where the funding formulas in the FNCFS 
Program create an incentive to remove First Nations children from their homes, as found by the 
Tribunal.161 Although this cannot be directly proven, the steady trend of increasing apprehension 
numbers since the time provincial child welfare agencies became involved on reserves to the 
present day suggests this is the case. 
The percentage of First Nations children in the care of provincial/territorial child welfare 
systems was close to zero in 1950. By 1980, First Nations children, who made up two per cent of 
the nation’s child population at the time, represented more than twelve per cent of the children in 
care.162 A Statistics Canada study in 2016 indicates that Aboriginal children account for almost 
half (forty-eight per cent) of all foster children in the country.163 A July 2015 report breaks the 
overrepresentation down by provinces and territories:164 
 
Juris. % of Aboriginal children in 
population 
% of children in care who are 
Aboriginal 
BC 8 55 
AB 9 69 
SK 25 65 
MB 23 87 
ON 3 21 
QC 2 10 
NB 3 23 
NS 6 23 
NL 11 34 
NT 61 95 
NU 85 94 
YK 33 64 
 
Johnston dubbed the significant increase in First Nations child apprehension from the 
1960s to the 1980s as the “Sixties Scoop.”165 It refers to the statement of a BC social worker who 
admitted to him that provincial social workers would scoop children from reserves on the 
slightest pretext.166 Children were also placed in non-Indigenous homes with little consideration 
of the need to preserve their culture and identity.167 Public discourse on the “Sixties Scoop” 
describes it in the past tense. Yet, although the specific intention to take Indigenous children 
                                                          
161 Ibid at para 344. The Tribunal also found poor coordination between these various programs at para 381. 
162 See Johnston, supra note 10, ch 4. 
163 Statistics Canada, “Study: Living Arrangements of Aboriginal Children Aged 14 and Under, 2011”, in Insights 
on Canadian Society, Catalogue No 75-006-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 13 April 2016), online: 
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/160413/dq160413a-eng.htm?HPA> [perma.cc/A3YR-3PCZ]. 
164 Aboriginal Children in Care Working Group, Aboriginal Children in Care Working Group: Report to Canada’s 
Premiers (July 2015) at 7. Note that no data for PEI was reported as the province does not track the ethnic origin of 
children in care due to reasons of confidentiality. 
165 See Johnston, supra note 10, ch 4. There has been class action litigation on the Sixties Scoop, and there is now a 
decision from the Ontario Superior Court from February 2017 finding that Canada was negligent by failing to take 
steps to prevent Aboriginal children who were placed in the care of non-Aboriginal foster or adoptive parents from 
losing their Aboriginal identity (see Brown, supra note 47 at para 83). 
166 Johnston, supra note 10 at 23. 
167 TRC, “Legacy,” supra note 101 at 4. 
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away from their families and culture may now be gone, government neglect, assimilative laws 
and policies, and paternalism are nonetheless producing similar, if not more stark, results. 
Intended or not, Indigenous children continue to be scooped from their families in staggering 
numbers. This is so notwithstanding the creation of FNCFS Agencies to make First Nations child 
welfare services more culturally appropriate. Unfortunately, the hard work of the staff of such 
Agencies is outmatched by chronic underfunding and significant legal and policy restraints 
imposed by outside governments.  
 
III. THE CARING SOCIETY DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Part II reviewed numerous harms present within the First Nations child welfare services. These 
stem from three structural features that are common to all First Nations essential services: federal 
neglect; provincial comparability; and program devolution. Here I explore how the Caring 
Society decision finally equips First Nations with the legal arguments to show these are 
violations of their human rights. This should clear the path towards the only real alternative to 
the status quo, self-government.  
 
A. CONFIRMS CANADA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO FIRST NATIONS 
 
First, the Tribunal’s ruling is remarkable in being the first decision to hold the federal 
government fully accountable for the significant role it plays in First Nations child welfare. 
Canada argued that the Canadian Human Rights Act168 did not apply to the complaint, as 
“funding” is not a service contemplated under the Act. More broadly, Canada argued child 
welfare was under provincial jurisdiction and the federal government only became involved in 
child and family services “as a matter of social policy under its spending power”169 and not 
pursuant to any obligations owing under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These 
arguments were soundly rejected by the Tribunal, who, in addition to finding that funding in 
itself can constitute a service under the Act,170 also found that Canada plays a primary role in 
child welfare services on reserve. In support of this finding, the Tribunal referred to the fact that 
the manner and extent of Canada’s funding significantly shapes the child and family services 
provided.171 Second, beyond funding, the Tribunal noted that Canada provides policy direction 
and oversight, and also negotiates and administers agreements with First Nations and/or 
provinces and territories regarding child welfare services.172 The Tribunal found that Canada is 
“not a passive player”173 in its arrangement with First Nations and/or the provinces/territories. It 
found that, ultimately, it is Canada that has the power to remedy inadequacies with the provision 
of child and family services and improve outcomes for children and families residing on 
reserve.174 Overall, the Tribunal noted that Canada in fact exercises significant control, 
discretion, and influence over child welfare services on reserve “through policy and other 
                                                          
168 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [CHRA]. 
169 Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 34, 78. 
170 Ibid at para 40. 
171 Ibid at para 71. 
172 Ibid at paras 66, 73. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid at paras 73, 75–76. 
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administrative directives,”175 and that First Nations children and families are a vulnerable 
category of people vis-à-vis Canada in this regard. 
Further, the Tribunal thoroughly dismissed Canada’s attempts to minimize its 
responsibility and pass it off to the provinces. The Tribunal was not persuaded by Canada’s 
argument that the status quo on reserve is the inevitable result of the division of powers in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, but instead concluded that it was as a result of a series of choices made 
by the federal government. The Tribunal recognized that Canada had the power to legislate over 
First Nations child welfare and chose not to, instead taking “a programing and funding 
approach”176 to child welfare on reserve. The Tribunal also recognized that the application of 
provincial child welfare legislation and standards through the enactment of section 88 of the 
Indian Act was a deliberate choice of the federal government.177 The Tribunal emphasized that 
Canada should not be able to evade its responsibilities to First Nations children and families by 
delegating the implementation of child and family services to FNCFS Agencies or the 
provinces/territories,178 stating that such delegation “does not diminish [Canada’s] constitutional 
responsibilities… .”179 
According to the Tribunal, the fact that Canada did not directly deliver the service on 
reserve could not be the end of the matter and could not be the excuse to allow Canada to escape 
scrutiny under the CHRA.180 The Tribunal’s appreciation of the workings of the First Nations 
child welfare system impressed upon it that, 
 
[D]espite not actually delivering the service, [Canada] exerts a significant amount of 
influence over the provision of those services. Ultimately, it is [Canada] that has the 
power to remedy inadequacies with the provision of child and family services and 
improve outcomes for children and families residing on First Nations reserves and in 
the Yukon … .181 
 
These findings are a strong confirmation of Canada’s responsibility over child welfare 
services, and there is no reasonable basis to see why they would not apply with equal force to all 
other essential services programs provided by Canada on reserve. Canada has long used the fact 
of not having legislated to minimize its responsibility over services on reserve. These findings by 
the Tribunal will now prevent Canada and INAC from evading accountability. In fact, the 
Tribunal went so far as to use the above findings to suggest that Canada may owe First Nations 
specific fiduciary duties in the circumstances.182 First Nations’ vulnerability to the extensive 
control and discretion that Canada exercises over the delivery of child welfare services was a 
significant factor in the Tribunal’s analysis of fiduciary duty.183 As discussed in Part I, there are 
many examples of First Nations’ vulnerability to INAC’s power and discretion in the delivery of 
                                                          
175 Ibid at para 105. 
176 Ibid at para 83. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid at para 84. 
179 Ibid at para 83. 
180 Ibid at para 84. 
181 Ibid at para 85 [emphasis added]. 
182 Ibid at paras 99–110. (The Tribunal ultimately held it was not necessary to decide the point to address the 
complaint, but suggested there were very likely specific fiduciary duties owing because INAC’s exercise of 
extensive discretion stood to affect important interests of First Nations, namely First Nations’ Aboriginal rights to 
transmission of their Indigenous languages and cultures.) 
183 Ibid at para 105. 
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essential services on reserve. By these obiter comments, the Tribunal has breathed new life into 
the fiduciary duty doctrine as a mechanism for redress from abuse of INAC’s discretion.184 
However, the Tribunal also made findings that will permit First Nations to challenge provincial 
comparability and program devolution, as I turn to next. 
 
B. FINDS SYSTEMS THAT PERPETUATE HISTORIC DISADVANTAGE 
ENDURED BY ABORIGINAL PEOPLE ARE DISCRIMINATORY 
 
The Tribunal’s decision makes it clear that Canada, in providing services on reserve, cannot 
perpetuate the historical disadvantage endured by Aboriginal peoples.185 In this regard, the 
Tribunal found strong links between the residential school system and the on-reserve child 
welfare system. The Tribunal observed that when residential schools started to close in the 
1960s, the extension of child welfare services on reserves came to be seen as its replacement in 
the eyes of government authorities.186 At the time, the assumptions underlying significant 
numbers of First Nations children taken into state care via the “Sixties Scoop” were the same 
assumptions underlying the residential school system: namely that First Nations parents were not 
capable of properly caring for their children.187 
The Tribunal found that the FNCFS Program continues to perpetuate the legacy of 
residential schools today because Canada’s systemic underfunding of the program creates 
incentives to remove children from their homes as a first resort rather than as a last resort.188 The 
Tribunal also suggested that the removal of children by child welfare authorities and placement 
in non-Indigenous homes resembles the residential school system because it also stands to 
adversely impact First Nations children’s ability to learn their languages and culture, which the 
Tribunal found are Aboriginal rights that all First Nations children possess.189 Finally, the 
Tribunal also suggested that the child welfare system perpetuates the residential school era 
because First Nations have little to no control over this system:  
 
Similar to the Residential Schools era, today, the fate and future of many First Nations 
children is still being determined by the government, whether it is through the application 
of restrictive and inadequate funding formulas or through bilateral agreements with the 
provinces.”190 
  
The implications of the Tribunal’s findings here are significant. The key message from 
the Tribunal is that perpetuating systems that are assimilative—prohibiting or adversely 
impacting First Nations’ ability to exercise their culture and control their own destinies—is 
discriminatory. As seen in Part II, provincial comparability, where we see the federal 
government imposing both provincial substantive norms and funding schemes to First Nations, 
was intended to be assimilative and certainly has been assimilative in its effect in the context of 
First Nations child welfare. Program devolution, although arguably intended to give greater 
                                                          
184 But see Brown, supra note 47 at paras 65–71 where the Ontario Superior Court rejected a similar argument 
(albeit the reasoning on fiduciary duty in the case is sparse). 
185 Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 403. 
186 Ibid at paras 218, 413–14. 
187 Ibid at para 413. 
188 Ibid at para 344. 
189 Ibid at para 109. 
190 Ibid at para 426 [emphasis added]. 
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control to First Nations and move them towards self-government (albeit with an underlying 
current of paternalism), has similarly had an assimilative effect by strictly controlling First 
Nations’ activities and subjecting them to excessive amounts of government oversight. Paired 
with chronic underfunding of essential services on reserves, program devolution has left First 
Nations in the situation of administering their own poverty. Without going so far as explicitly 
saying so, the Tribunal has suggested a strong connection between First Nations’ equality rights 
and their right to self-government. This is bolstered by the final significant legal conclusion of 
the Tribunal in Caring Society, which I turn to next. 
 
C. FINDS COMPARABILITY STANDARD DISCRIMINATORY 
 
While the Tribunal found that the funding of child welfare services was far below and not 
comparable to similar services in the provinces and territories, it concluded that equality for First 
Nations requires more than just providing the same level of funding. In this regard, the Tribunal 
found that INAC’s comparability standard is itself discriminatory. According to the Tribunal, an 
approach on reserve that seeks to mirror funding provided by the provinces and territories is not 
consistent with substantive equality as it does not consider “the distinct needs and circumstances 
of First Nations children and families living on reserve, including their cultural, historical and 
geographical needs and circumstances.”191 
The Tribunal’s analysis was informed by international law principles, based on the 
presumption of conformity that holds that international human rights standards should inform the 
interpretation of domestic law (unless Canadian legislation clearly states the contrary).192 In this 
regard, the Tribunal took account of commitments Canada has made under the International 
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.193 The Tribunal 
also considered the 2011 Withler v Canada (Attorney General) decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, where the Court rejected the idea that the complainant in a discrimination complaint must 
establish a comparator group that is identical to it in every way, except on the protected ground of 
discrimination, in order to show difference in treatment. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated, 
“finding a mirror group may be impossible, as the essence of an individual’s or group’s equality 
claim may be that, in light of their distinct needs and circumstances, no one is like them for the 
purposes of comparison.”194 From this, the Tribunal distilled the principle that First Nations are 
entitled to services that meet their particular needs and circumstances, not simply services 
identical to the provinces’. Although not cited by the Tribunal in its decision, such reasoning is 
also consistent with other recent Supreme Court of Canada cases involving services provided to 
Anglophone and Francophone communities. In those cases, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
substantive equality can mean distinctive content in the provision of similar services, depending 
on the nature and purpose of the services in issue, as well as the characteristics of the population 
                                                          
191 Ibid at para 465. The Tribunal suggests that, while provincial legislation and standards can be a useful reference 
for assessing the adequacy of funding and services on reserve, it cannot be the sole, or driving, reference point (ibid 
at para 462). 
192 Ibid at 431–35. 
193 Ibid at paras 436–55. 
194 Withler, supra note 5 at para 59. 
31
Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 28 [2018], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol28/iss1/13
  
to be served.195 In another case, the Supreme Court stated, “The designated beneficiaries [of a 
service] may and undoubtedly should affect how those services are delivered… .”196  
According to the Tribunal, in order to meet the governing standard of equality, both 
funding and services on reserve must meet the needs of First Nations children and families and 
be culturally appropriate. The Tribunal found that INAC’s funding, as it was inadequate, 
obviously prevented the services provided by the FNCFS Program from being culturally 
appropriate, asking “If funding does not correspond to the actual child welfare needs of a specific 
First Nation community, then how is it expected to provide services that are culturally 
appropriate?”197 
This finding directly impugns the provincial comparability as discriminatory. It also 
renders program devolution, to the extent that funding agreements impose comparability on First 
Nations, discriminatory. Further, like the Tribunal’s discrediting of systems that perpetuate First 
Nations assimilation, this finding bolsters the connection between First Nations’ equality rights 
and their right to self-government. The connection is demonstrated in the following rhetorical 
question: How can a program meet the needs of the community and be culturally appropriate if 
the standards underlying it are not designed and controlled by First Nations themselves? Or, 
returning to the quote of the member of the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council quoted earlier in the 
introduction: “The principle is simple. Only Indian people can design systems for Indians. 
Anything other than that is assimilation.”198 
By requiring that child welfare services meet the actual needs and circumstances of First 
Nations children and families and not be assimilative in nature, Caring Society effectively 
mandates that First Nations must exercise meaningful control over the design and delivery of 
such services. In other words, it sanctions self-government in this fundamental service area. 
“Self-government” is a term with varying definitions and can take a variety of forms.199 In this 
regard, RCAP observed that, 
 
For some peoples, it may mean establishing distinct governmental institutions on an 
‘exclusive’ territory. For others, it may mean setting up a public government 
generally connected with modern treaties or land claims agreements. Alternatively, 
self-government may involve sharing power in joint governmental institutions, with 
guaranteed representation for the nations and peoples involved. In other instances, it 
may involve setting up culturally specific institutions and services within a broader 
framework of public government.200 
                                                          
195 DesRochers v Canada (Industry), [2009] 1 SCR 1994; Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v 
British Columbia (Education), 2015 SCC 21. See also Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30, at paras 53–55 (in the context 
of correctional services). 
196 NIL/TU,O, supra note 103 at para 45. This is in the context of provincial child welfare legislation (BC) aiming to 
accommodate First Nations interests. The decision is problematic, however, in that it is in tension with the 
constitutional rule against provincial legislation “singling out” First Nations for favourable or adverse treatment (see 
supra, note 103). It also takes for granted the application of provincial child welfare laws on reserve, which, based 
on the reasoning in Caring Society, may well be discriminatory (see also supra, note 27). 
197 Ibid at para 425. 
198 Penner Report, supra note 7 at 29. 
199 RCAP, vol 2, supra note 132, ch 3 at 106; Stephen Cornell, Catherine Curtis & Miriam Jorgensen, “The Concept 
of Governance and its Implications for First Nations” (2004) Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No 2004-
02, at 8–10; Rae, supra note 48 at 8; Naiomi Metallic, “Indian Act By-Laws: A Viable Means for First Nations to 
(Re) Assert Control over Local Matters Now and Not Later” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 211 at 213. 
200 RCAP, vol 2, supra note 132 at 106. 
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Cornell et al likewise argue that the powers a community may pursue under self-
government can vary: “There is no one set of jurisdictional powers that determines whether or 
not a First Nation is truly self-governing… . For instance, social services may be a priority for a 
community that is in healing from a history of conflict or abuse, while resource use may be a 
priority for a community with a large land base.”201 Similar to RCAP, the authors indicate that 
self-government could possibly involve shared jurisdiction with other governments, stating that 
“self-rule does not necessarily mean absolute sovereignty across the board.”202 Nor need it mean 
that First Nations would have to be entirely self-financed in the exercise of self-government, 
since federal funds are often essential and are justified in light of the crippling resource loss 
historically imposed on First Nations peoples.203 
Despite the variability in the form self-government can take, RCAP emphasized that “[i]n 
its most basic sense, it is the ability to assess and satisfy needs without outside influence, 
permission or restriction.”204 This concept of self-government fully aligns with the main 
propositions in Caring Society that (1) First Nations are entitled to child and family services that 
meet their cultural, historical, and geographical needs and circumstances, and (2) such services 
cannot be assimilative in design or effect. This is especially so when these propositions are fully 
understood in the context of the harms of the FNCFS Program reviewed above. 
To be clear, the Tribunal in Caring Society never goes as far in its reasoning to directly 
make this connection between substantive equality and First Nations self-government. But it is a 
significant implication of the decision, especially given the Tribunal’s comments that equality 
prohibits the perpetuation of historic disadvantage like the legacy of residential schools. That 
being said, this reading of the case leaves some uncertainty. Taken to its logical conclusion, the 
finding that services on reserve must meet community needs and circumstances and be culturally 
appropriate suggests section 88 of the Indian Act and the application of provincial child welfare 
legislation on reserve is discriminatory.205 For the most part, the Tribunal remained largely silent 
on the imposition of provincial child welfare laws on First Nations via section 88 of the Indian 
Act. The Tribunal’s only comment about section 88 was to suggest that it does not “diminish 
[INAC]’s constitutional responsibilities [to First Nations].”206 To be fair to the Tribunal, the 
complainants did not challenge section 88 of the Indian Act as discriminatory, but only the 
                                                          
201 Cornell et al, supra note 203 at 15. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid at 21. This finding is consistent with article 4 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007) [UNDRIP], which states that 
“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government 
in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous 
functions” [emphasis added]. 
204 Similarly, Rae has argued: “What matters for the purpose of being self-governing is not any particular form, but 
rather the extent of the nation's ability to choose its own structure, laws, mechanisms and institutions” (supra note 
48 at 8). 
205 As stated at supra note 27, although section 88 was regarded as a basis for provincial legislation, including child 
welfare legislation, applying on reserve, the Supreme Court of Canada later clarified that most provincial laws apply 
ex proprio vigore. The analysis in Caring Society is in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dick, supra 
note 27. I would argue that the decision in Caring Society displays a much greater appreciation of the realities faced 
by First Nations owing to jurisdiction neglect, as well as a greater appreciation of how the Aboriginal right of First 
Nations children to their language and culture, as well as First Nations rights to self-government, are implicated in 
the area of child welfare. Dick was decided in 1985, and as I suggest in note 27, it may be time for the Supreme 
Court to revisit it. 
206 Caring Society, supra note 1 at para. 83. 
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funding of the FNCFS Program. Thus, the Tribunal was not asked to decide whether the 
imposition of provincial child welfare laws on reserve was itself discriminatory and it may not 
have wanted to address the issue head-on. On the other hand, we could also draw inferences from 
the Tribunal’s overall recommendation to Canada for INAC to “REFORM”207 its child welfare 
program “in order to build a solid foundation for the program to address the real needs of First 
Nations children and families living on reserve.”208 Obviously, the Tribunal’s emphasis on the 
word ‘reform’ (all-caps and underlined) signals that it envisioned a transformative overhaul of 
FNCFS, jettisoning key structures in the status quo. Moreover, although not using language such 
as “self-government” or prescribing what the reformed FNCFS Program should look like, the 
Tribunal’s lengthy review of the harms of the FNCFS Program in the decision and the 
condemnation of it as replicating the Indian Residential School system provide clear guidance on 
what the reformed FNCFS Program should not resemble. 
Beyond the area of First Nations child welfare, the Tribunal’s implicit linking of self-
government and substantive equality and human rights is in itself noteworthy. This is a new 
argument for First Nations self-government in Canada. It stands separate and apart from 
arguments based on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Arguments for recognition of a 
section 35 right to self-government have stagnated since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in R v Pamajewon, where the Supreme Court held that to prove a right to self-government, it 
would have to be shown that the right was integral and distinctive to the pre-contact culture of an 
Aboriginal group.209 This restriction on Aboriginal self-government in Pamajewon has been 
roundly criticized as unduly limiting First Nations’ ability to self-govern in the twenty-first 
century.210 However, the Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue.211 On the political front, in 
the last thirty years, the federal government has concluded a handful of self-government 
agreements and passed legislation enabling some Indigenous groups to have greater control over 
some matters, but this has been slow and piecemeal.212 The resistance of courts and governments 
to greater recognition of self-government may be influenced in part by resistance to section 35 
rights owing to questionable perceptions that these are “special” rights. An argument for First 
Nations self-government rights framed as a human right might be more graspable to certain 
members of the public. While it is true that self-government is already recognized as a 
fundamental human right of Indigenous peoples in international law,213 such a principle has yet 
to be fully accepted within domestic law. Paul Joffe has argued that until an Indigenous right to 
                                                          
207 Ibid at para 463 [emphasis in original]. 
208 Ibid.  
209 R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821. 
210 See e.g. BW Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R v Pamajewon” 
(1997), 42 McGill LJ 1011; PJ Vicaire, “Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Rights in a 
North American Constitutional Context” (2013), 58 McGill LJ 607 at 656–57; JE Dalton, “Exceptions, Excuses and 
Norms: Aboriginal Self-Determination in Canada: Protections Afforded by the Judiciary and Government” (2006) 
21:1 Can JL & Soc’y 11 at 19–20. 
211 To date, the Court has had at least two opportunities to do so. In 2008, the Court denied leave to hear a case that 
would have required it to squarely reconsider its decision in Pamajewon (see Mississaugas of Scugog Island First 
Nation v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) 
et al, 2008 CanLII 18945 (SCC)). In 2011, it denied leave to hear a case that would have allowed it to directly 
address the right to self-government again (see Chief Mountain et al v Attorney General of Canada, et al, 2013 
CanLII 53406 (SCC)). 
212 Naiomi Metallic, “Ending Piecemeal Recognition of Indigenous Nationhood and Jurisdiction: Returning to 
RCAP’s Aboriginal Nation Recognition and Government Act” forthcoming in Redefining Relationships: Indigenous 
Peoples and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Center, 2019) at ch 10. 
213 See article 4 of the UNDRIP, supra note 207. 
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self-government is understood through a human rights framework, violations or denials of 
Indigenous rights will continue to be treated casually by governments and courts.214 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article I have tried to tell the story of how First Nations have come to be saddled with an 
extremely dysfunctional and problematic system for essential service delivery on reserve, using 
the First Nations child welfare system on reserve as an illustration. The provision of child 
welfare services, like all essential services on reserve, is characterized by three structural 
features: federal neglect of its responsibility over such services; provincial comparability; and 
program devolution. Together, these features wreak serious harms on First Nations people. In the 
child welfare context, this includes the imposition of culturally inappropriate provincial child 
welfare standards on reserve over which First Nations have little to no say. It also involves First 
Nations and their Agencies being bound to “take it or leave it” funding agreements that impose 
significant controls and reporting requirements and are based on arbitrary funding formulas that 
have resulted in over a decade of known underfunding. Cumulatively, these problems have 
contributed to the staggering overrepresentation of First Nations children in state care. 
Meanwhile, the federal government’s half-hearted commitment to the provision of child welfare, 
inconsistent and arbitrary interpretation of program terms, and unilateral imposition of funding 
terms have been extremely difficult for First Nations to challenge. 
The Caring Society decision is a powerful indictment of this system. First, it finds that 
Canada—not the provinces—is primarily responsible for child welfare and must be held 
accountable for knowingly underfunding services to some of the most vulnerable people in this 
country, First Nations children. Second, it finds that child welfare services on reserve have been 
perpetuating a system reminiscent of the residential school system because First Nations children 
are being separated from their families, losing language and culture, and “the fate and future of 
many First Nations children is still being determined by the government.”215 Third, it finds the 
“comparability standard” to be discriminatory because it insists on mirroring of provincial 
standards and funding, instead of promoting programming reflective of First Nations needs and 
circumstances. Although only dealing with the Department’s child welfare program, the decision 
has broad implications for the delivery of programs on reserve, suggesting that all essential 
service delivery is inconsistent with the standard of substantive equality. 
For decades, First Nations have argued that self-government is an inherent Aboriginal 
right, recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and international 
law.216 Now the Caring Society decision also suggests it is a matter of human rights.217 While the 
decision does not speak directly about self-government, this would appear to be the inevitable 
result of a human rights-compliant approach since the only way for programs to be truly 
                                                          
214 Paul Joffe, “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Canada Government Positions Incompatible 
with Genuine Reconciliation” (2010) 26 Nat’l J Const L 121 at 136. 
215 Caring Society, supra note 1 at para 426. 
216 See e.g. Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (Research Paper for the 
National Center for First Nations Governance, 11 October 2007); Peter Hutchins, “The Golden Thread of 
Continuity, the Federalism Principle and Treaty Federalism—Where’s the Gap?” (Paper delivered at the National 
Center for First Nations Governance “Rebuilding our Nations” Conference, 3 March 2009). 
217 The right to self-government, as part of the larger right of self-determination, is recognized as a fundamental 
collective human right of Indigenous peoples under international law. See Brenda Gunn, “Moving Beyond Rhetoric: 
Working Toward Reconciliation Through Self-Determination” (2016) 38 Dalhousie LJ 237. 
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culturally appropriate and meet community needs and circumstances is for them to be designed 
and controlled by First Nations. Anything else perpetuates assimilation. The Caring Society 
decision therefore arms First Nations with very powerful arguments to push for the dismantling 
of the current dysfunctional, discriminatory, and wholly unacceptable system for program 
delivery on reserve in favour of self-government. 
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Appendix A. Provincial Child Welfare Services On-Reserve, 1960–1980218 
 Agreem
ent219 
Services Offered Funding  
BC 1962 - Only child protection and in-care 
services, not pre-protection, such as 
daycare 
- Feds pays 100% of 
costs 
AB None  - Prior to 1970s, only intervened in the 
most extreme cases of neglect 
- Since 1970s, investigation, 
assessment, counselling in cases of 
abuse or neglect, and foster or 
residential care placement for 
apprehended children 
- Feds reimburse fixed 
rate for foster care, 
and per diem for those 
in group homes or 
institutions 
- Administrative costs 
not included 
SK None - Limited services (“life or death”) and 
only where feds unable or unwilling 
to provide the services 
- Prov bills feds for full 
costs to status Indian 
children 
M
B 
None - Only limited services (primarily 
protection) in central & northern MB 
(serving 70% of Bands) 
- Feds totally reimburse 
provincial  
1966  
 
- Full range of services to 14 Bands 
located in southern MB 
O
N 
1965 - Same child welfare services 
available to other Ontario residents 
- Province recovers 95–
97% of the total costs 
Q
C 
Various 
tripartite 
- Since 1970s, individual agreements 
signed between Band Council, social 
services centres, and Canada.  
- Includes full range of child welfare 
programs 
- Cost is totally 
subsidized by the 
federal government 
1975 - James Bay Agreement provides for 
transfer of child welfare to province 
(using Cree employees) 
- Costs are shared 
between Quebec and 
feds 
NB None - Services extended to residents as 
requested or required 
- Feds reimburses the 
per diem and 
supervision costs of 
status children in care 
- Other services are 
recovered through the 
Canada Assistance 
Plan 
NS 1964 - Same child welfare services provided 
to other residents, including 
assessment, counselling, child 
protection and placement services, 
- Canada reimburses 
province for 100% of 
the costs 
                                                          
218 Based on summary by Johnston, supra note 10 at 7–16. 
219 Unless indicated otherwise, these are bilateral agreements between the federal and provincial/territorial 
government. 
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homemaker and daycare services, 
research and evaluation 
PE
I 
None - Services provided upon request from 
a chief or welfare office 
- Feds reimburse 
province for per diem 
costs related to foster 
care; administrative 
costs not covered 
NL 1965 - Same child welfare services 
extended to Indian communities (at 
the time, no reserves in NFLD) 
- Cost sharing—10% 
province; 90% feds 
NT None - Status Indians receive the complete 
range of child welfare services 
provided by the NWT Department of 
Social Services 
- Included in the overall 
federal/territorial 
financial agreement 
and there are no 
special provisions 
relating only to child 
welfare. 
Y
K 
1961 - Full range of child welfare services 
provided by Yukon government to 
all status Indians—includes 
protection, family counselling, foster 
and group home care, adoption 
services 
- Feds reimburse 
Yukon for 100% of 
actual costs of 
services to status 
Indian children in care  
- Fixed dollar payment 
for administrative 
costs. 
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Appendix B. Current Picture of First Nations Child Welfare Services220  
Province Service Provider Lawmaker Funding 
BC Provincial agencies serving some 
communities 
Province Federal—reimbursement 
of costs 
16 Delegated FNCFS Agency Province Federal based on 
Directive 20-1 
1 Band Agency (Splatsin FN) FN pursuant to 
Band by-law  
Federal  
2 First Nations Agency pursuant 
to Self-Government / 
Comprehensive Claim Agreement 
(Sechelt FN & Nisga’ Lism FN) 
FN (fed and prov 
approved) 
Federal 
AB Provincial agencies serving some 
communities 
Province Federal—reimbursement 
of costs 
12 Delegated FNCFS Agencies Province Federal based on EPFA 
SK 12 Delegated FNCFS Agencies Province Federal based on EPFA 
MB 9 Delegated FNCFS Agencies Province Federal based on EPFA 
ON 9 Delegated Agencies Province Federal reimburses 
province based on cost-
sharing in 1965 
Agreement 
QC 9 Delegated FNCFS Agencies Province Federal based on EPFA 
NB 7 Delegated FNCFS Agencies  Province Federal based on 
Directive 20-1 
NS 1 Delegated FNCFS Agencies  Province Federal based on EPFA 
PEI 1 Delegated FNCFS Agency  Province Federal based on EPFA 
NL Provincial agencies serving some 
communities 
Province Provincial 
1 Delegated FNCFS Agency  Province Federal based on 
Directive 20-1 
NT Territorial agencies Territory Territory but federal 
contribution through 
territorial transfer 
agreement 
YK Territorial agencies Territory Federal based on 
Directive 20-1 
 
 
  
                                                          
220 Summary prepared based on Bennett, supra note 56; Sinha & Kozlowski, supra note 60; National Collaborating 
Center for Aboriginal Health, supra note 60; First Nations Family and Child Caring Society, supra note 61. 
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Appendix C. Indigenous Specific Provisions in Provincial/Territorial Child Welfare Legislation 
Types of 
provisions 
BC
221 
AB SK
222 
M
B 
ON QC NB
223 
NS PE
I 
NL
224 
NT  YK 
Notification/part
icipation of FN 
in hearing 
✓
225 
✓
226 
✓
227 
✓
228 
✓
229 
✓
230 
 ✓
231 
✓
232 
 ✓
233 
✓
234 
FN involvement 
in case 
management / 
ADR 
 ✓
235 
✓
236 
 ✓
237 
   ✓
238 
  ✓
239 
FN involvement 
in service 
planning or 
delivery 
✓
240 
✓
241 
  ✓
242 
      ✓
243 
Customary ✓
244 
   ✓
245 
✓
246 
 ✓
247 
   ✓
248 
                                                          
221 British Columbia has Aboriginal Operational and Practice Standards manual (see TRC “Legacy,” supra note 101 
at 20). 
222 The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations’ Indian Child Welfare and Family Support Act exists alongside 
provincial legislation and includes standards recognized by the province as equivalent to ministerial policies, 
practices, and standards (see TRC, “Legacy,” supra note 101 at 20). 
223 While having no specific provisions in its legislation, NB has a Micmac and Maliseet First Nations Service 
Standards Manual. 
224 The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, SC 2005, c 27 takes precedence over the Child, Youth and 
Family Services Act, SNL 1998, c C-12.1. There are no other special considerations for Indigenous people in 
Newfoundland. 
225 Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46 at ss 33.1(4), 34(3), 35(1), 36(2.1), 38(1), 39(1), 
42.1(1) [Child, Family and Community Service Act]. 
226 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c C-12, s 67 [Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act]. 
227 The Child and Family Services Act, SS 1989-90, c C-7.2, ss 23(1)(b); 37(10)–(11) [The Child and Family 
Services Act, SS]. 
228 The Child and Family Services Act, CCSM c C80, ss 30, 38, 77. 
229 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 14, Sch 1, ss 17(4), 186 [Child, Youth and Family 
Services Act]. 
230 Youth Protection Act, CQLR c P-34.1, s 81.1. 
231 Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, ss 36(3), 78(4). 
232 Child Protection Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-5.1, ss 12(3.1), 13(7), 13(8), 29(2), 35(1) [Child Protection Act]. 
233 Child and Family Services Act, SNWT 1997, c 13, ss 12.3, 27(2), 29(2) [Child and Family Services Act, SNWT]. 
234 Child and Family Services Act, SY 2008, c 1, ss 2(d), 27(1), 28, 32(d), 47, 48 [Child and Family Services Act, 
SY]. 
235 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 226, s 3.1. 
236 The Child and Family Services Act, SS, supra note 227, s 15. 
237 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 229, s 17(2). 
238 Child Protection Act, supra note 232, s 16. 
239 Child and Family Services Act, SY, supra note 234, s 7(1)(c). 
240 Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 225, s 3(b). 
241 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 226, s 107. 
242 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 229, ss 68(3), 72–73, 338. 
243 Child and Family Services Act, SY, supra note 234, s 2(e). 
244 Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 225, s 71(3). 
245 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 233, ss 71, 80, 101(5), 109(2), 187(2), 198(5), 212(1). 
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adoptions / 
kinship 
placements 
FN involvement 
in cultural 
connection plan 
 ✓
249 
          
Connection of 
FN child to 
culture / best 
interest 
✓
250 
✓
251 
  ✓
252 
  ✓
253 
✓
254 
 ✓
255 
✓
256 
Agreement to 
develop own 
child protection 
program 
     ✓
257 
      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
246 Youth Protection Act, supra note 234, ss 71.3.1–2. 
247 Children and Family Services Act, supra note 235, s 68(11). 
248 Child and Family Services Act, SY, supra note 238, ss 89, 134. 
249 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 230, ss 52–53. 
250 Child, Family and Community Service Act, supra note 229, ss 2(f), 4(2). 
251 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, supra note 230, ss 52(1), 56(1) and 57.01, 58.1, 63, 71.1. 
252 Child, Youth and Family Services Act, supra note 233, ss 74(3)–(4), 109(2), 187(1). 
253 Children and Family Services Act, supra note 235, ss 6(kb), (kc), 76(1). 
254 Child Protection Act, supra note 236, ss 12(3.1), 13(7). 
255 Child and Family Services Act, SNWT, supra note 237, s 3. 
256 Child and Family Services Act, SY, supra note 238, ss 2(d), 2(2). 
257 Youth Protection Act, supra note 234, s 37.5. 
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